Saturday, September 24, 2005
What's up with the EAC RFP's?
At this point, it is unclear how many of these RFP's have been awarded; as of today, five of the projects are still listed on the EAC RFP page for current RFP's (05-04, 05-08, 05-09, 05-10, 05-11), so one might assume the rest had been awarded. But many of us who are on the EAC mailing list for RFP received the following notice:
EAC is withdrawing the following solicitations. None of the proposals received met the minimum technical
evaluation threshold.
RFP#05-03 Research Assistance to Study the Feasibility and Advisability of Establishing a Program of Free Return Postage for Absentee Ballots
RFP #05-10 Research Assistance to Improve Election Data Collection
Anyone who submitted a proposal for either of these solicitations and wishes a de-brief may email their request ...
As additional information comes along on these RFP awards, we'll do our best to keep our blog readers updated.
For those interested in the issue of election data collection, there are some reference materials that have been placed on the EAC RFP page for study 05-10 ("Improvement of Election Data Collection") worthy of reading. In particular, take a look at the "EDS Recommendations on Future Data Collection" which has a detailed eight-page discussion of future ideas on how the EAC or others can better collect data like that in the 2004 EAC election day, voter registration, and military/overseas absentee ballot surveys (which are also provided on the RFP page for 05-10).
Thursday, September 22, 2005
Into the eye of the storm
Wednesday, September 21, 2005
Carter Baker Report Beatings Continue
Today, the report was attacked on the ID requirements issue in the Washington Post and to a lesser degree in the LA Times, and coverage was generally negative and on this point in the Christian Science Monitor.
It is interesting how this issue and the regional primary issue have both overwhelmed any positive message that could arise from the report. For example, the nonpartisan election officials would have been, in itself, a perfectly smart thing to build a set of recommendations around. I can easily imagine recommendations on standards for election official certification and training, improved poll worker training standards, and the like to go along with the nonpartisan recommendation.
The report seems doomed to fan the flames on both sides instead of building a consensus. It is easy to imagine how this happened. In developing a "balance" in the report, Republicans and Democrats both agreed to let the other side include one of "their" items. The problem is that election reform isn't a highway bill where you can trade projects. In the work of the 2001 National Commission on Federal Election Reform (I was part of the professional staff there), the Commission really pushed the consensus approach as opposed to the balance recommendations approach. Without consensus and thinking through what will be the response to recommendations, it is difficult to create a report that will not, as one Democratic Staffer said, "The commission's report will gather dust on a shelf."
Tuesday, September 20, 2005
NVRA report highlights data problems, changes in how voters register
There are some interesting things to note about this most recent report.
One is that this is the first NVRA implementation report issued by the EAC; in the past, the reports have been issued by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Those who have worked in this area know that try as it might, the FEC was never adequately resourced to produce detailed reports; the quality of the FEC reports going back to the 1997-1998 reporting cycle (they are now archived on the EAC website) just provides current proof of that problem. The good news is that this most recent report is a well-produced document, available in html and pdf formats, well-written and relatively easy to read --- a step in the right direction (when will they make the underlying data available with the reports in a useful format, though?).
Second, the report presents data that gives as mixed portrait of the current status of voter registration in the United States. To quote from the report's summary:
Overall, voter registration increased in the 2004 general election, compared to the 2000 presidential election. Responses from 48 states showed total registration at more than 174.8 million voters in 2004, compared to the 162.4 million reported in 2000 from all 50 states and the District of Columbia ... While the actual number of registered voters increased in the past four years, the rate of growth did not keep up with the growth rate of the voting age population. As a result, the percent of the voting age population that is registered to vote decreased from 78.9 percent in 2000 to 78.5 percent in the 48 states that reported data to the EAC.
Third, the report presents detailed state-by-state and national data on the origins of voter registration applications. Interestingly, in the 2003-2004 survey, 32.8 percent of applications came from motor vehicle offices, 32.4 percent by mail, and 25.4 percent in person. Unfortunately, the 2003-2004 survey was the first to ask states to report the number of in person applicants, making comparisons to previous report a bit tricky. But it is worth note that in the 2001-2002 reporting cycle, states claimed 42.77 percent of applicants came from motor vehicle offices and 27.64 percent by mail. Thus, the percentage of new registrants coming through the mail appears to have increased considerably, while the percentage coming from motor vehicle offices seems to have fallen dramatically. The available data from the 1997-1998 report indicates that these trends might be a recent phenomenon, as then registration by mail "accounted for nearly one quarter of all voter registration applications from 1997 through 1998", while registrations from motor vehicle agencies represented 42.9 percent of applications then.
Fourth, there are some methodological issues that this most recent report documents well. One is that the EAC survey was unable to achieve complete coverage; two states and one territory did not provide data in 2004; several states and territories provide partial responses to the survey; and some states provided data that did not cover all local jurisdictions. That states either don't or can't report relatively important facts about how elections are being administered makes it difficult for policymakers and researchers, and also makes it hard to see how we can implement the type of end-to-end election auditing that many (like the the Caltech/MIT VTP) are advocating.
But here is the other methodological issue, lifted directly from page 5 of the report:
The 2004 Election Day Survey found that states report voter registration totals in different ways. Twenty-six states provided reports that included active voters only; reports from 20 states include both active and inactive voters. In four states, determination of whether to include active and inactive voters in reports of registered voters was at the discretion of local election jurisdictions.
This has obvious implications for those who use this data --- comparability across states might be more problematic than we had realized before.
This last methodological issue also presents a dilemma that will need to be overcome as states start thinking of how to make their voter registration systems interoperable across state lines. We clearly need to make sure that states have identical definitions for registration status; to borrow a term that folks who do statistics will find familiar, states will need some sort of "data dictionary" before trying to compare files across state lines --- and such "data dictionaries" might need to be part of data transaction standards for voter registration systems.
Controversy continues to brew over Carter-Baker report
Monday, September 19, 2005
More on the Carter-Baker report
- Dan Tokaji took the Commission report to task early today, focusing on the Commission's call for Congress to pass a "voter-verified paper audit trail" requirement for voting machines, the voter identification proposals, and how the Commission report characterized MIT colleague (VTP co-director) Ted Selker's study of Nevada's use of VVPAT in a recent election.
- Tova Wang argues the the Carter-Baker report is much too heavily focused on voter fraud, and instead asserts that there are a set of problems in American elections, primarily associated with various forms of disenfranchisement.
- Rick Hasen (like us!) says that the Commission's call for nonpartisan election administration is the right call. Rick notes that there is material in the report (for example on the scheduling of presidential primaries) that is "distracting", and he faults the Commission's proposals on voter identification.
- Spencer Overton, a member of the commission, has issued an official dissent. Spencer's official dissent is summarized:
The Commission's "Real ID" recommendation is more restrictive than the photo ID proposal rejected by the Carter-Ford Commission in 2001, and more extreme than any ID requirement adopted in any state to date. The Commission's proposal is so excessive that it would prevent eligible voters from proving their identity with even a valid U.S. passport or a U.S. military photo ID card.
In addition, the Commission's Report fails to undertake a serious cost-benefit analysis. The existing evidence suggests that the type of fraud addressed by photo ID requirements is extraordinarily small and that the number of eligible citizens who would be denied their right to vote as a result of the Commission's ID proposal is exceedingly large. According to the 2001 Carter-Ford Commission, an estimated 6% to 10% of voting-age Americans (approximately 11 million to 19 million potential voters) do not possess a driver's license or a state-issued non-driver's photo ID, and these numbers are likely to rise as the "Real ID Act" increases the documentary requirements for citizens to obtain acceptable identification. The 2005 Carter-Baker Commission does not and cannot establish that its "Real ID" requirement would exclude even one fraudulent vote for every 1000 eligible voters excluded. - I just received a dissent from the Brennan Center, co-authored with Spencer Overton, which appears to be 31 pages long ... focusing on the voter identication proposals, and recommendations to use Social Security numbers for voting-related activities, and proposals for felon re-enfranchisement.
- Paul Gronke has offered a series of his reactions on his Early Voting blog, especially an interesting "critique of the critique" --- his analysis of claims made in the Brennan Center critique regarding race and absentee balloting.
- And as Thad noted earlier today, the League of Women Voters called "the recommendations a grab bag of recycled proposals."
Thad quickly summarized our primary reactions to the report, two of which seem to be consistent with much of the reaction so far available. It is nice to see the Commission report support the call for nonpartisan election administration, though Thad and I share many of the concerns expressed about the recommendations for voter identification.
A few additional points to raise about the Commission's work.
First, the Commission recommended (2.3.2) "a provisional ballot cast in the incorrect precinct but in the correct jurisdiction should be counted". This is an important, and worthwhile recommendation that should be a national action item for election reformers; it was something I called for in my testimony before the Commission.
Second, the Commission had one recommendation on election observation (8.1.1), essentially that "All legitimate domestic and international election observers should be granted unrestricted access to the election process ... Such observers should apply for accreditation ..." Having tried to observe the election process directly in jurisdictions in the United States, I know how important it is that election officials open the process to public observation, but I am very concerned about calls for "accreditation", as such requirements can just serve to block legitimate observers and scholars from being able to see the inner workings of the election administration process. Caution here is warrented, as we certainly do not want to make it more difficult for independent and external election observation. (If you want to see some of the product of our election observation efforts, still unfortunately unpublished, see the many pictures and material we collected simply by observing the 2005 Los Angeles Mayoral Election, for which we needed no advanced accreditation.)
Third, as noted in an earlier post, the word in Washington is that the prospects for federal action on election reform is pretty bleak, certainly in the near future. Good news on this front is that the Knight Foundation (who sponsors the work of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project) has recently awarded an $800,000 four-year grant to The Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute "to monitor the implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and develop a bipartisan policy agenda for futher administration reform ... Brookings and AEI plan a collaborative effort extending through the 2008 elections to synthesize research; develop a bipartisan, practical national policy for election reform; monitor the implementation of HAVA and its proposed amendments; and ensure that research and policy recommendations are fed into the policy process in a timely and productive manner." We are looking forward to working with these folks (Tom Mann and Norm Ornstein?) on this ambitious agenda, but it is going to be a difficult struggle to get election reform to become part of the federal agenda in the coming years.
Last, for the record, in addition to testifying before the Commission's during their hearings at Rice, I also was an "Academic Advisor" to the Commission.
Carter Baker Report
- First, the report supports the concept of nonpartisan election administration; we issued a report this summer on the public's attitudes toward election administration.
- Second, the report endorses the idea contained in our IBM Business of Government report on the need for interoperability in voting systems and voter registration systems.
- Third, the report is likely to generate much controversy on the issue of voter identification. Three members of the commission called the ID requirement"modern day poll tax" (as noted in the Washington Post). We have discussed the issue of IDs before, and it is a complex issue both politically and administratively.
Thad's writing about the Katrina aftermath
Sunday, September 18, 2005
A Disaster Waiting to Happen
Imagine that what happened in Louisiana and Mississippi had happened more widely--say, a series of terrorist attacks causing mass havoc in 10 states, not two or three, with all or most of their lawmakers killed in one of the attacks on the Capitol. What would happen under this law? Louisiana and Mississippi would have had to have chosen the candidates for all their seats days ago--even as rescue operations continued, with all officials mobilized every minute of every day to provide basic services, and with the states coping with hundreds of thousands of evacuees.Election officials would have then had basically until the end of this month to get all the polling places ready to go, print ballots or prepare their electronic machines (all assuming there is electricity to run them) and the candidates would have to have begun to run their campaigns. Oh, one other “technicality”: voters would have to be home to cast their ballots. Or found, very quickly, to cast absentee ballots (which would have to be printed in the days after the candidates were selected. Maybe at the local Kinko’s--oops, it’s under water). And voter registration records, in some cases also under water, would have to be uncovered to make sure that the voters were voting in the right districts--including voters without any ID.
This is the core of Congress’ response to the terrorist threat to governing institutions, and it is farcical.
Ornstein's concern is based in part on the fact that, for the past 3 years, the Congress--especially the House--has been unwilling to consider what would happen in the case of its own demise. Ornstein directed the Continuity of Government Commission, which examined the question of what would happen if a majority of members of the House of Representatives were to be killed or incapacitated. As Ornstein explained after 9-11, if a majority of members of Congress were not killed but were incapacitated, say be a nerve gas or a dirty bomb attack, the Congress literally could not meet because there would be no quorum of members. If most members were killed, the country might be left under the goverance of a very small minority of members. The Commission recommended creating a constitutional amendment to address the problem, but Congress has yet to act. And if 9-11 and Katrina cannot force them to act, what will?