Election Updates

Yesterday, the Washington Post released an internal Department of Justice memo in which career DOJ lawyers recommending rejecting the Georgia ID law because of its likely discriminatory effect on minorities (article here with links to the memo).

The memo and debate is interesting on several grounds.

First, most people have little idea how the preclearance process works, and this memo provides an illustration of the facts that are used in making these determinations.

Second, the case illustrates how important it is to think through the implications of changes in election laws. Here, when you make ID requirements very strict, you have to think through questions like: How accessible are driver's licence offices? How costly is public transportation (both the nominal cost of the ride and the opportunity costs to the person who has to get the license)?

Third, the social science used in this work are very interesting. The DOJ uses very straightforward analyses of who is affected by the change. They found, for example, that minorities are more likely to live in counties without a driver's licence office and also not have a car. However, the data on driver's licenses for Georgia are abysmal according to the DOJ analysis (and are likely to be abysmal in most places). People who have moved, died, or otherwise should not be in the database remain there. (Clearly there is a need for states to exchange better data here!) This makes analyzing racial differences among people with a driver's licence and without a driver's licence.

Finally, the articles in the Thursday and Friday Washington Post also get at the political nature of elections. Politics is largely shaped by those who control the rules of the game. It should not be surprising that there are politics involved in this process. Of course, it remains disappointing that, once again, basic analysis of social science data gets trumped by the better political argument.

Last week, I blogged about the idea of having everyone vote on paper ballots with a receipt in response to a recent call for such a system to be implemented. The other component of this proposal that was made was that these paper ballots would be hand counted. I want to focus on this issue of hand counting in part because it gets to a key problem with our voting process – ballot length.

There are several problems with hand counted ballots. As Steve Ansolabehere and Andrew Reeves have found, hand counting is an inaccurate method for counting, especially when compared to electronic counting techniques. Using data from New Hampshire recounts, they found that counts done electronically have less variance than counts conducted by hand.

However, even if hand counting were perfect, there is a quite practical reason for election officials to want to use electronic tabulation: ballot length. In American, we like to vote on a lot of stuff, preferably all at once. For example, the 2004 election in most states included at least three federal offices—the president, the Senate, and the House. It also likely included some state elections for the legislature, possibly for judges, and for state referenda and amendments. At the local level there were also likely some races and issues to be decided.

In non-presidential elections, ballots are even longer. Even though the president is not on the federal ballot, in most states the ballot balloons with elections for governor, lt. governor, attorney general, secretary of state, other state executive branch elected officials, state legislative races, local races, and more referenda.

The math for counting ballots becomes quite complicated once we consider how many races are on the ballot. An extreme example would be Los Angeles County, which may have more than one million ballots cast in any given general election. If there are 10 races on the ballot, this would make for 10 million different counts that would have to be conducted. Even if a jurisdiction is smaller—for example, 10,000 ballots cast—10 races would make for 100,000 different counts that would have to be conducted.

Moreover, ballots in California have candidate lists that are rotated by assembly precinct. For a statewide race, a random draw of letters is done, and candidates with a last name starting with the letter drawn first are listed first in assembly district one, last in district 2, and then move up the list. This also complicates the counting process.

The obvious retort to this problem is that the Europeans and other nations vote on paper ballots and know the results quickly, why can’t we? The answer lies in this ballot length question. In many of these countries, elections are all held on different cycles. A local election is just that—a local election for a single office, or perhaps 2 offices—and each election might be voted on different ballots (you vote a single race per ballot and put each ballot in a different box). A federal election or state election would be similar. Referenda would be voted on separately as well.

In the early 1900s, there was a “Short Ballot” movement, which is well-documented in the American Political Science Review. (For those of you with access to JSTOR, do a search for "short ballot movement.") It aimed to reduce the number of state and local elected officials. The short ballot was part of a bread progressive agenda that included creating the initiative, referenda, recall, direct primary and secret ballot. Supporters offered several potential benefits to this reform. First, it would increase the responsiveness of the government because it centers power in the governor and ensures that there are not competing power centers in state government. Second, it would make voting easier, since individuals would only be voting on a small set of races where voters would be relatively knowledgeable about the races. Some advocates in the short-ballot movement suggested that there should not be more than five races on a ballot.

In the United States, such a system would mean completely rethinking the election process. Instead of having two major elections in November of even-numbered years, there would be more states looking like New Jersey, where state legislative and gubernatorial elections are in odd-numbered years. Moreover, elections might also look more like they do in the city of Los Angeles, where municipal elections are held in the spring and early summer of odd-numbered years.

What is the problem with implementing this? Cost is one. Local election officials would now run major elections every year, and two major elections—state or federal plus local elections—in some years. This would increase ballot printing costs, since there would be no economy of scale from having multiple races on the ballot. It would also increase poll worker recruitment costs, poll worker payment costs, and polling site access issues. Governments would have to make a commitment to running elections differently and be willing to pony up the money to accomplish this.

Not only would the fiscal costs increase, the costs for voters would increase as well. Voters would have to be willing to perform their civic duty more often, with fewer races on the ballot to bring them out to vote. Given the relatively high number of non-competitive races that exist currently in both the Congress and state legislatures, the benefits of voting might be low relative to the costs of turning out to vote.

One obvious solution to this problem would be to expand alternate voting methods, especially all-vote-by-mail balloting. However, this rounds counter to some of the proponents of the paper balloting, who want voters to cast ballots in person and receive the accompanying receipt.

Given the likely difficulty that would exist in accomplishing these changes in ballot length and election timing, we can expect electronic voting to exist well into the future.

One extraordinary thing I've learned after watching polling place operations, in a number of different jurisdictions since 2000, is that every polling place is unique. There has been little or no discussion of standards for polling places --- their layout, their accessibility, parking, lighting, and so on. And so as we rapidly approach the 2006 federal election cycle, it is clear that many problems still exist with polling place practices.

These problems arise, typically, because election officials have great difficulty securing polling places, especially in places like California where we seem to have had so many elections recently. So election officials sometimes seem to get stuck in a bind, needing polling places of a certain size in certain places, and thus having to take what they are offered. They thus select sites which to outside observers sometimes look like bad choices for polling places.

A continuing problem is accessibility for disabled voters. Our observers have repeatedly documented polling places in every recent election that either are not accessible for disabled voters, or are often very difficult for disabled voters to access. One example of this problem was seen in stark detail in the recent mayoral election in the City of Los Angeles, at a voting precinct located inside the gym of the Rockdale Elementary School, 1303 Yosemite Drive. This picture of the only entrance to the polling place that was unlocked shows the accessibility problem; note that I am standing on the top of a flight of stairs, waving (me in the blue shirt), while VTP team observer Karen Kerbs (in white jacket) is standing at the bottom of the stairs. An inspector from the city clerks office arrived while we where at this location (in fact, she might be the person in the blue shirt on the cell phone down the street from us); I pointed out the accessibility problem to her, to which she agreed it was a problem, and made a note of it. Of course, there are procedures in place for "curbside" voting, but that requires that the disabled voter be able to get the attention of a polling place worker, it distracts the polling place worker from their duties inside the polling place, and it may not give the disabled voter the opportunity to cast a secret and private ballot.

Here is another example from the recent California special election, at a polling place located within the Pasadena Open Bible Church, 130 North Hill Avenue in Pasadena. This situation was spotted by some of my Caltech undergraduates, who wondered how a disabled voter could possibly navigate this accessibility ramp. It appears that there was originally a ramp to enter this building associated with the church, but that subsequently the structure on the left was erected, blocking the ramp. Polling place workers seemed somewhat unaware of the situation, until the students pointed it out to them, and their response was to note that they would be happy to lift a voter's wheelchair, or to help a voter, into the polling place.

Luckily, poll workers recognize some of the difficulties that disabled voters face. Here is a good example, at the Corona Fundamental Intermediate School, located at the intersection of Main and Grand, in Riverside County. The polling place inspector brought along his own orange cones and created signs to establish a parking place for disabled voters in the closest possible street parking location. Unfortunately, a disabled voter still had to make their way a few hundred feet up the street, and then down two school hall corridors, in order to cast their ballot inside the polling place.

This leads to a second accessibility issue, though one that might be more specific to urban jurisdictions than rural ones. That is voter parking. Parking is a significant issue in many areas, and is one that makes it difficult for some voters to have an opportunity to cast their ballot. In some cases voters must be really dedicated, and be willing to either find distant parking, or in some cases pay to park their cars while they vote. In one example last week, at the Church of the Angeles (110 North Avenue 64 at Church Street, Los Angeles County), an existing shortage of parking spaces for voters in a very small and crampled parking lot was compounded by the presence of a television or movie crew shooting something at the church on election day. Or it can just be the location of a polling place in a downtown area, here downtown Pasadena, while other local events are going on making it impossible to find any free parking in the immediate vicinity of the Pasadena Presbyterian Church (Colorado Blvd. at Madison).

These examples show that the parking accessibility issue exists in urban areas, especially when other events occur on election day in the same area. But one place where we repeatedly see difficulties with parking are public schools, during school hours. One example was shown earlier, at the Corona Fundamental Intermediate School. Another one was at the Garretson Elementary School (1650 Garretson Avenue, Riverside County). This first shot is from the street, showing that voters had to park across the street from the school, while school was in session. The second perspective is from within the parking lot.

Public schools, while in session, pose some unique challenges for polling place workers, other than the parking issue. As shown here at Murchison Street Elementary School (1601 Murchison Street, Los Angeles County), voters must be kept separate from school children (note the yellow warning tape), to keep the school orderly and to keep strangers from wandering around the campus (thus posing potential risks to the kids). And sometimes school life intrudes on the polling place, as shown here at Murchison Street Elementary School, where school officials needed access to some musical instruments in the middle of the voting day!

One final point about location. While laws prohibit "electioneering" within close proximity to polling places, they don't tend to cover other points of access to polling places. For example, in a vast parking lot behind the polling place located in a parish hall at the Corpus Christi Catholic Church (3750 Magnolia, Riverside County), one small "Yes on 73" sign was located in the parking lot, as was one large "Yes on 73" sign nearby. For those of you not closely following the California special election, Proposition 73 was the "Waiting period and parental notification before termination of minor's pregnancy" measure (this wording is from the official voter guide). There were no other political signs located in the vast church parking lot, and there is no indication that church officials or anyone actually associated with the church put the signs in the lot. However, the relationship of such signs in a catholic church parking lot, on election day, may raise some concerns. When organizations take positions on certain issues, and those issues are prominent features of an election like the special election, that may mean that election officials might exercise caution about using the facilities of such organizations for polling places.

Thus, there are clear issues associated with polling place location. In later essays I'll talk more about polling place layout and interior design. But as I started this essay noting, we probably need to initiate a discussion soon about the development of standards and useful best practices for polling places.

While I'm still going through my notes and photographs recording my polling place observations from last week's special election in Southern California, I did want to point out that all of my photographs are now available. I also have draft reports from some of our other observing teams that should be making their way to this same website soon.

There is an excellent opinion piece in today's Santa Cruz Sentinel, authored by Santa Cruz County election chief Gail Pellerin. In it, she details the hard work associated with running an election in California, like last week's special election, giving one perspective on the practical and logistical difficulties associated with running an election of this magnitude.

Some helpful excerpts:

A peek behind the scenes reveals the magnitude of the task of conducting a statewide election. The numbers are staggering to prepare for what appears to be a one-day event, but in reality is a multi-month endeavor. For the Nov. 8 Special Statewide Election, more than 15 million sample-ballot booklets were proofed, printed and mailed to each registered voter weeks ago by the state's 58 county election officials. Millions of official ballots were similarly prepared for voters' decisions. More than 4.5 million absentee ballots were mailed to voters, including to Californians residing in the farthest reaches of the globe, from Baghdad to Zanzibar. Statewide, nearly 25,000 polling places were reserved and readied, and more than 100,000 poll workers underwent training to serve voters on Election Day. Election officials continually train, test and plan for every contingency to deliver a seamless — and seemingly effortless — operation.

Accuracy and ballot security are of paramount importance. Gone are the days of dimpled and pregnant chads, as election officials convert to more modern methods of casting and tabulating votes. All voting systems in use in California have been extensively tested and certified for accuracy by the secretary of state. New electronic voting systems used in California must also obtain federal qualification before undergoing state certification. County election officials undertake additional tests to confirm the accuracy of certified ballot tabulating software and voting machines to ensure every vote is counted correctly. Where electronic voting machines are in use, the equipment is never connected to the Internet and cannot be accessed online.

...

Accuracy is achieved several weeks later after the completion of the total ballot tally and certification of official election results. Voters are often unaware that typically 10 to 20 percent of ballots cast statewide are counted in the days following the election. These include hundreds of thousands of absentee ballots that were not received until Election Day that must be individually signature verified prior to opening and counting; and provisional ballots cast by voters whose eligibility was not able to be established when they appeared at the voting precincts and must be researched.

California law permits 28 days to complete the final, official canvass of the vote. This process entails a meticulous review and reconciliation of all ballots and processes. A key part of the canvass includes a visual inspection and manual count of at least 1 percent of the ballots cast to verify computer-generated vote totals. And, rest assured, all valid ballots are counted; no ballots are ever thrown out. In fact, all election materials for a statewide election must be retained for six months, and if a federal contest is on the ballot, materials are retained for 22 months.

Franklin Jiron, one of the two Caltech undergraduates who went with me to the Alpine Recreation Center for the close of the polling place there (Franklin is pictured at the far left of the picture I posted on Friday of their observation efforts), and who went to the Los Angeles County Registrar/Recorder's office in Norwalk Tuesday evening to learn more about their efforts to tabulate cast ballots, has put his photographs up on his website. It is an interesting perspective to see, through the eyes of a newcomer to studying election administration, what the process looks like.

Just navigate to Franklin's website, and click on the link to "California Special Election 2005." Thanks to Franklin for distributing his photographs!

There are some really excellent images of Alpine Recreation Center and of the Norwalk operation in Los Angeles County. Don't miss the two short movies that Franklin has of the tabulation of ballots on the third page of photographic documentary.

I especially like the photograph of the ballot boxes that have just arrived in Norwalk (this is image "DSCF0021" in Franklin's set of images, the twenty-first of twenty-three). What has happened is that the sealed ballot boxes (the red boxes) arrive at Norwalk in fire-proof bags; the bags are opened, and these sealed red boxes are scanned with a barcode reader, and then are placed in these cardboard boxes into this huge wheeled container. Periodically these containers are wheeled over to an elevator, then taken upstairs to the area where the boxes are unsealed, ballots inspected, and ballots sent for tabulation.

What is really interesting about this photograph is the box that has the yellow seal on it. This is a ballot box that for some reason was not sealed, or the seal was broken, when it came out of the fire-proofed bag. We saw a number of these re-sealed ballot boxes that evening, and they typically were taken to a special location for detailed inspection.