Saturday, June 03, 2006
Questions raised about the ownership structure of Sequoia Voting Systems
By Mike and Thad
We've been hearing rumors the past few weeks that the LA Times was looking into questions regarding the ownership structure of Sequoia Voting Systems, especially that the company was linked to foreign investors. The central claim in the LA Times story was:
For folks who followed the Illinios primary earlier this year, these questions might ring some bells.
One of the larger questions this raises is something that the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project discovered in early research following the 2000 election, when we tried to study the state of election administration finance and the status of the voting technology industry. As the VTP wrote in the 2001 report, the most significant result of this research was that we could find little information on either how elections are financed in the United States, how much was being spent on election administration, and how the voting technology industry operates.
Regardless of whether or not foreign ownership of voting technology companies is problematic, the broader problem is a lack of transparency throughout the vendor-adminstrator relationship. Many people want to know what companies are supplying what components of the election administration process--at what cost--and basic information about those companies. What we really need is for states and the federal government to require strong and public disclosure, from companies that design, manufacture, sell, and repair voting technology--as well as from those who sell election administration materials and services--of their ownership structure, related financial information, and information about their contracts with jurisdictions in the state. This information should be readily available to the public in order to build confidence in the election administration process in the United States. This information would be invaluable for researchers, and it would be of great utility for election officials, so that they could research what other jurisdictions are paying for services or other acquisitions. It would be ideal if a clearinghouse of this information were created, so that the public could quickly and easily find the information they need, about all of the business interests that are involved in the process of running elections in the U.S.
This transparency should extend throughout the elections process. The public wants more and better information about the voting machine certification process, the voter registration system design process, the problems that arise in elections with voting technologies, and the extent to which states and localities are reliant on contractors and vendors to conduct the basic aspects of election administration. It is the lack of transparency that fuels rumors, innuendo, and conspiracies about the elections process. Information is the key to building confidence.
We've been hearing rumors the past few weeks that the LA Times was looking into questions regarding the ownership structure of Sequoia Voting Systems, especially that the company was linked to foreign investors. The central claim in the LA Times story was:
Sequoia, founded in Jamestown, N.Y., in the late 1890s, was acquired in March 2005 by Smartmatic Corp., a private company owned by Venezuelan investors through a series of holding companies based in Europe and the Caribbean. Sequoia's previous owner was the British firm De La Rue, best known for printing currencies for dozens of foreign governments.
Smartmatic emerged from obscurity the year before when it won a $100-million contract to supply touch-screen voting machines for an ultimately unsuccessful recall effort against Chavez in 2004.
For folks who followed the Illinios primary earlier this year, these questions might ring some bells.
One of the larger questions this raises is something that the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project discovered in early research following the 2000 election, when we tried to study the state of election administration finance and the status of the voting technology industry. As the VTP wrote in the 2001 report, the most significant result of this research was that we could find little information on either how elections are financed in the United States, how much was being spent on election administration, and how the voting technology industry operates.
Regardless of whether or not foreign ownership of voting technology companies is problematic, the broader problem is a lack of transparency throughout the vendor-adminstrator relationship. Many people want to know what companies are supplying what components of the election administration process--at what cost--and basic information about those companies. What we really need is for states and the federal government to require strong and public disclosure, from companies that design, manufacture, sell, and repair voting technology--as well as from those who sell election administration materials and services--of their ownership structure, related financial information, and information about their contracts with jurisdictions in the state. This information should be readily available to the public in order to build confidence in the election administration process in the United States. This information would be invaluable for researchers, and it would be of great utility for election officials, so that they could research what other jurisdictions are paying for services or other acquisitions. It would be ideal if a clearinghouse of this information were created, so that the public could quickly and easily find the information they need, about all of the business interests that are involved in the process of running elections in the U.S.
This transparency should extend throughout the elections process. The public wants more and better information about the voting machine certification process, the voter registration system design process, the problems that arise in elections with voting technologies, and the extent to which states and localities are reliant on contractors and vendors to conduct the basic aspects of election administration. It is the lack of transparency that fuels rumors, innuendo, and conspiracies about the elections process. Information is the key to building confidence.
Thursday, June 01, 2006
Maryland battles continue
It's tough to avoid a train wreck, even when you see it coming. That's what the battle in Maryland looks like to me, and colleagues who I talked to at the AEI/Brookings conference felt the same way.
The Baltimore Sun story brings us up to date. In brief
Get out of the way, Maryland citizens. The wreck is coming!
The Baltimore Sun story brings us up to date. In brief
- Opponents have submitted sufficient signatures to force the early voting plan onto the ballot, but the attorney general indicates that they may be too late, because early voting was adopted more than a year ago (but there are disagreements with this interpretation)
- The secretary of state, Mary Kay, who must approve the signatures, is the wife of the head of the state Republican Party
- Both sides believe that early voting will end up being critical in a set of hard fought contests in the Fall.
Get out of the way, Maryland citizens. The wreck is coming!
Felon Voting Rights
USA Today has an article on an effort in Rhode Island to change the law that disenfranchises felons. It is always interesting to remember the statistics on felon disenfranchisement. As the article notes:
The article also has a nice table that shows the felon enfranchisement laws in all 50 states. One of the recommendations that the National Commission on Federal Election Reform made was to liberalize the rules for the re-enfranchisement of felons. Ironically, the commissioner who proposed this recommendation was one of the more conservative members but one who came to think that it was very important to allow people who have paid their debt to society become part of civic life.An estimated 5.3 million people cannot vote because of a felony conviction, says Ryan King, policy analyst for the Sentencing Project, a research group that favors changes in prison and sentencing rules. Thirty-six states deny that right to felons while they're on parole, and 31 of them also bar voting by felons on probation.
King and other advocates of changing those rules say the restrictions punish people who have served their time and disproportionately affect the poor and people of color.
"In states where there's 20% to 30% of African-Americans who are prohibited from voting, that's a significant portion of the population not being represented by their state or federal legislators," King says.
Some prohibitions against felons voting are being eased:
• Nebraska lawmakers in March passed legislation automatically restoring voting rights to felons two years after they complete their sentences, including probation and parole. The state previously had a lifetime ban.
• Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack last year signed an executive order automatically restoring voting rights to felons who have completed their sentences, including probation or parole, or received early release.
• Coalitions of former inmates, faith-based organizations and civil rights groups are registering voters and lobbying election officials and lawmakers in Rhode Island, Kentucky and other states.
More early voting observations from California, and a question about the Diebold VVPAT device
In the past two days, we've done some additional observation of early voting, again at the Jackie Robinson location in Pasadena, and in West Covina.
First, we made a short visit to the Jackie Robinson center in Pasadena yesterday, where I accompanied a friend who wished to try early electronic voting. The one photo I took of the site shows the two chairs in front of the demonstration video. My friend was authenticated to vote before he could watch the complete video (which we learned here was indeed available in both English and Spanish, a question that we had noted in some of our earlier early voting observations in which the video only seemed to play in English and the pollworkers seemed to think that it was only able to run in English).
My friend's voting experience went fine, but afterwards, when we were walking in front of the early voting location, he asked me about the paper audit trail. He wanted to know where it was on the voting device. I was surprised, and asked him whether or not he had seen it when he voted ... he said he didn't see any paper trail, and didn't know where it was. This, by the way, is someone who works with technology all day long and is very much a techie!
Second, I went with one of our graduate students today to the early voting location at the West Covina County Library; here is a picture of the exterior of the site. It was right off the 10 freeway in West Covina, was easily visible from the surface streets, and there was plenty of parking! There were plenty of signs directing us to the early voting location, and when we we came into a well-light and well-established early voting site, with a very friendly and helpful polling place inspector (who answered all our questions!). Turnout was relatively slight; we were there for over an hour, and saw perhaps a dozen or so folks vote.
Here are pictures of the polling place. The first shows most of the voting devices, with the polling inspector showing our student the voting devices. The second pans left, showing the rest of the voting devices and the area where pollworkers authenticated the voters. The third moves further left, showing the entrance to the room, the table where voters check-in, and behind that, the area where voters can watch the demonstration video (here playing in English and Spanish). The final photo is a close-up of the demonstration video area.
Immediately after taking these pictures, during a period when there were no voters present in this location, I went over and talked with the inspector and our student about the voting devices. At that point, two interesting things happened. First, I noticed one somewhat unusual thing about the way the paper audit trail device on the Diebold machines used in LA County was set up that could explain why some --- like my friend above --- seem unaware of the presence of the paper audit trail (more about that below!). The second was that at this point (with no voters present) I requested to take a picture of the aspect of the voting device that I had questions about, and then two of the pollworkers strongly objected and said we could not take photos and that we should not be in a position where we could see the screens of the voting devices.
The inspector objected to this (defending our observing rights!), but the student and I left the area, and apoligized. The inspector listened to their objections, then called his superiors. After a number of phone calls between the inspector and headquarters, and the pollworkers and headquarters, we were informed that we could indeed see the screens of the voting devices and take photos, as long as no one was voting. Three cheers for openness and for letting observers have access to the process (and special thanks to the Los Angeles Registrar/Recorder, Conny McCormack and her great staff who try to give researchers and observers as much access to the election process as they possibly can)!
Now, back to the issue I noted with the Diebold VVPAT device. Given that pollworkers were objecting to my photographs (and looking at the screen of the voting machines), I decided not to take a picture, but instead will refer readers to this photo. Here, the VVPAT device is located on the lower right of the terminal, underneath the blue shield that is perpendicular to the machine (the actual VVPAT paper ballot is behind that shield). I noticed that on one of the voting devices today this shield was closed, thus meaning that unless a voter using that device with the shield closed knew where the VVPAT was located and opened the shield, he or she might not be aware that the VVPAT ballot was even there! [Note that one of the pollworkers who did not want us looking at the machines walked around and flipped the screen up today after we noted this problem.]
Is this the reason my friend yesterday was not aware of the VVPAT ballot? I don't know. Is this leading some voters to be confused about the VVPAT? Maybe. I asked the inspector why that shield was there, and he said that he thought it was there to protect the device for storage. My reaction is that it should be removed when the devices are in operation (or somehow fixed open during voting), just to insure that it is not shut and that it does not either confuse voters or lead them to not know where their VVPAT ballot is located.
First, we made a short visit to the Jackie Robinson center in Pasadena yesterday, where I accompanied a friend who wished to try early electronic voting. The one photo I took of the site shows the two chairs in front of the demonstration video. My friend was authenticated to vote before he could watch the complete video (which we learned here was indeed available in both English and Spanish, a question that we had noted in some of our earlier early voting observations in which the video only seemed to play in English and the pollworkers seemed to think that it was only able to run in English).
My friend's voting experience went fine, but afterwards, when we were walking in front of the early voting location, he asked me about the paper audit trail. He wanted to know where it was on the voting device. I was surprised, and asked him whether or not he had seen it when he voted ... he said he didn't see any paper trail, and didn't know where it was. This, by the way, is someone who works with technology all day long and is very much a techie!
Second, I went with one of our graduate students today to the early voting location at the West Covina County Library; here is a picture of the exterior of the site. It was right off the 10 freeway in West Covina, was easily visible from the surface streets, and there was plenty of parking! There were plenty of signs directing us to the early voting location, and when we we came into a well-light and well-established early voting site, with a very friendly and helpful polling place inspector (who answered all our questions!). Turnout was relatively slight; we were there for over an hour, and saw perhaps a dozen or so folks vote.
Here are pictures of the polling place. The first shows most of the voting devices, with the polling inspector showing our student the voting devices. The second pans left, showing the rest of the voting devices and the area where pollworkers authenticated the voters. The third moves further left, showing the entrance to the room, the table where voters check-in, and behind that, the area where voters can watch the demonstration video (here playing in English and Spanish). The final photo is a close-up of the demonstration video area.
Immediately after taking these pictures, during a period when there were no voters present in this location, I went over and talked with the inspector and our student about the voting devices. At that point, two interesting things happened. First, I noticed one somewhat unusual thing about the way the paper audit trail device on the Diebold machines used in LA County was set up that could explain why some --- like my friend above --- seem unaware of the presence of the paper audit trail (more about that below!). The second was that at this point (with no voters present) I requested to take a picture of the aspect of the voting device that I had questions about, and then two of the pollworkers strongly objected and said we could not take photos and that we should not be in a position where we could see the screens of the voting devices.
The inspector objected to this (defending our observing rights!), but the student and I left the area, and apoligized. The inspector listened to their objections, then called his superiors. After a number of phone calls between the inspector and headquarters, and the pollworkers and headquarters, we were informed that we could indeed see the screens of the voting devices and take photos, as long as no one was voting. Three cheers for openness and for letting observers have access to the process (and special thanks to the Los Angeles Registrar/Recorder, Conny McCormack and her great staff who try to give researchers and observers as much access to the election process as they possibly can)!
Now, back to the issue I noted with the Diebold VVPAT device. Given that pollworkers were objecting to my photographs (and looking at the screen of the voting machines), I decided not to take a picture, but instead will refer readers to this photo. Here, the VVPAT device is located on the lower right of the terminal, underneath the blue shield that is perpendicular to the machine (the actual VVPAT paper ballot is behind that shield). I noticed that on one of the voting devices today this shield was closed, thus meaning that unless a voter using that device with the shield closed knew where the VVPAT was located and opened the shield, he or she might not be aware that the VVPAT ballot was even there! [Note that one of the pollworkers who did not want us looking at the machines walked around and flipped the screen up today after we noted this problem.]
Is this the reason my friend yesterday was not aware of the VVPAT ballot? I don't know. Is this leading some voters to be confused about the VVPAT? Maybe. I asked the inspector why that shield was there, and he said that he thought it was there to protect the device for storage. My reaction is that it should be removed when the devices are in operation (or somehow fixed open during voting), just to insure that it is not shut and that it does not either confuse voters or lead them to not know where their VVPAT ballot is located.
Radio West Show on Electronic Voting
I was on the NPR show "Radio West" which is an interview show on the local NPR affiliate here in Salt Lake City. Here is the show blurb:
You can here the show by clicking HERE.
The 2000 Presidential election forced officials to rethink the voting process and to begin replacing outdated methods. Critics of new electronic technology worry though about ease of use, security, poll worker training and more. Doug is joined by the University of Utah’s Thad Hall, former Emery County Clerk Bruce Funk and Salt Lake County Clerk Sherrie Swenson for a look at the evolution of electronic voting and the disputes of a developing system.In addition, Dan Wallach and a representative from Black Box Voting were interviewed as well. The host was very balanced trying to get at the essence of this debate and probe the politics of this issue. It was fun largely because the conversation was rather sober and did not have much of the hysterics that can be associated with discussions of e-voting.
You can here the show by clicking HERE.
Wednesday, May 31, 2006
California county-level data from "Statement of Vote", 1964-1996
One of the new features of the revamped Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project's website is a page that will archive datasets that we have been used in VTP research, or in other research on election reform. We just archived there a set of Excel spreadsheets that have some of the county-level data from California "Statements of the Vote" (SOV), in the statewide and presidential general elections from 1964-1996. These data were compiled some time ago, but as I recently had a student who needed these data for a new project we decided to make them available to the research community.
These datasets, as well as others that are being archived as part of the VTP, are available at http://votingtechnologyproject.org/data.htm.
If you have datasets that you'd like archived here, or linked to from this page, shoot me an email and we'll see what we can do.
These datasets, as well as others that are being archived as part of the VTP, are available at http://votingtechnologyproject.org/data.htm.
If you have datasets that you'd like archived here, or linked to from this page, shoot me an email and we'll see what we can do.
New book from Spencer Overton, "Stealing Democracy"
In the mail today I received a copy of a new book by Spencer Overton, titled "Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Supression." This looks to be a provocative and thorough examination of many of the things that continue to ail our electoral process. I've only had a chance to skim the book this evening, but after skimming it and reading the materials that came with it, it is clear that Spencer is covering a number of problems: redistricting, a highly decentralized election administration process, minority voter suppression, attacks on the Voting Rights Act, pressures on language-minority voters, and photo identification requirements at polling places.
I hope to be able to give it a thorough read soon, and if I have additional comments, I'll post them here.
But no matter where you fall on the many dimensions of election reform, this looks like a must-read volume!
I hope to be able to give it a thorough read soon, and if I have additional comments, I'll post them here.
But no matter where you fall on the many dimensions of election reform, this looks like a must-read volume!
Voting problems in Arkansas
I just got off the phone with a reporter from the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. We talked about problems that Arkansas has faced, and continues to face, this primary election season.
Problem 1: Late delivery of materials The company that received a 16 million dollar contract from the state, ES&S, missed almost two deadlines: providing printed absentee ballots and supplying DREs for early voting which were properly programmed.
I don't know what is going on with ES&S. Perhaps Arkansas gave the company the candidate information too late in the game, perhaps something else happened. But it concerns me that this is the same company with which Multnomah County, OR had problems in its most recent primary election.
Problem 2: A quick run-off For historical reasons related to one-partism, many Southern states hold a run-off among the top two candidates in the primary (VO Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, pg. 416-23) .
The problem is one that we've seen before and will undoubtedly see again: an interaction between a historically contingent institution (the primary runoff) and new changes to voting.
In Arkansas, this runoff takes place three weeks after the primary. And once you allow for in-person and no-excuse absentee balloting, this means new ballot machinery has to be prepared, and new ballots printed, within a week of the primary results. (See the timeline at the Arkansas Secretary of State's Office.
Add to the mix counting problems and delays similar to those we saw in Cook County, IL, and you have a recipe for election confusion and public distrust.
Problem 3: Inadequately trained poll workers The third problem that the reporter discussed with me was that many older poll workers were unfamiliar with the new ES&S machines. The result was long lines at some precincts (and this for a low turnout primary).
Arkansas is contemplating rules changes in order to accomodate the new realities of electronic balloting and early voting, including more extensive poll worker training and pushing back the time of the primary runoff.
Problem 1: Late delivery of materials The company that received a 16 million dollar contract from the state, ES&S, missed almost two deadlines: providing printed absentee ballots and supplying DREs for early voting which were properly programmed.
I don't know what is going on with ES&S. Perhaps Arkansas gave the company the candidate information too late in the game, perhaps something else happened. But it concerns me that this is the same company with which Multnomah County, OR had problems in its most recent primary election.
Problem 2: A quick run-off For historical reasons related to one-partism, many Southern states hold a run-off among the top two candidates in the primary (VO Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, pg. 416-23) .
The problem is one that we've seen before and will undoubtedly see again: an interaction between a historically contingent institution (the primary runoff) and new changes to voting.
In Arkansas, this runoff takes place three weeks after the primary. And once you allow for in-person and no-excuse absentee balloting, this means new ballot machinery has to be prepared, and new ballots printed, within a week of the primary results. (See the timeline at the Arkansas Secretary of State's Office.
Add to the mix counting problems and delays similar to those we saw in Cook County, IL, and you have a recipe for election confusion and public distrust.
Problem 3: Inadequately trained poll workers The third problem that the reporter discussed with me was that many older poll workers were unfamiliar with the new ES&S machines. The result was long lines at some precincts (and this for a low turnout primary).
Arkansas is contemplating rules changes in order to accomodate the new realities of electronic balloting and early voting, including more extensive poll worker training and pushing back the time of the primary runoff.
Early Voting in Los Angeles
As Mike has already mentioned, he and I observed one early voting pollsite together on Thursday May 25 in Monterey Park. Since I had never been there, we did a test to see how easy or difficult it would be for me to find the polling location. Shortly before he arrived on campus to pick me up I printed out the directions using Google maps (I don't know why I used Google--I usually use Yahoo! maps...this proved to be problematic). I navigated us to Monterey Park using the Google directions and simply could not find the pollsite! We turned around twice before Mike decided to start taking, what appeared to me, random turns. We finally found the street we were looking for and thus, the pollsite. I was very frustrated because Google maps was wrong--perhaps if I had had a close-up of the area I may have found it...but I didn't so I was stuck with the incorrect map. I looked up the location again afterwards and saw that the map was in fact correct...so this potential voter's problem was an error on her part.
If I had been a voter with a limited amount of time, I'm not sure I would have made it to the pollsite that day. Even though the directions I had weren't quite right, it would have been much more helpful if there had been signs posted on the main cross streets indicating where the pollsite was located. We saw none whatsoever. I found this test to be very interesting and it illustrates one of the problems voters encounter when going to a pollsite to which they've never been.
In general, the observation experience was very educational for me...and quite fun really. Mike and I discussed the various issues that we observed which few voters we observed experienced. It spoke volumes to me the problems that still remain for voters in the current voting technology climate.
If I had been a voter with a limited amount of time, I'm not sure I would have made it to the pollsite that day. Even though the directions I had weren't quite right, it would have been much more helpful if there had been signs posted on the main cross streets indicating where the pollsite was located. We saw none whatsoever. I found this test to be very interesting and it illustrates one of the problems voters encounter when going to a pollsite to which they've never been.
In general, the observation experience was very educational for me...and quite fun really. Mike and I discussed the various issues that we observed which few voters we observed experienced. It spoke volumes to me the problems that still remain for voters in the current voting technology climate.
"University of Utah Researcher on Election Reform"
Imagine my surprise this morning when I opened my email and found the following media update: "University of Utah Researcher on Election Reform: Political Science Professor Studies Election Law." I was shocked ... but then found out it was only Thad! Here's the blurb:
Here's a link where you can listen to Thad's commentary on election reform!
Election 2006 will mark the first under the "Help America Vote Act" or HAVA - created in the aftermath of the 2000 election debacle in Florida.
University of Utah researcher Thad Hall is part of a group researching the best practices around the country regarding vote counting and recount rules. He recently presented his preliminary findings to the United States Election Assistance Commission. He tells KCPW's Bryan Schott many states need an overhaul of their election laws.
Here's a link where you can listen to Thad's commentary on election reform!
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
EAC College Poll Worker Grants Redux
The EAC reissued their College Poll Worker Grant Proposal and asked that we post it so here it is!
For Immediate Release
May 26, 2006
For Immediate Release
May 26, 2006
Contact:
Jeannie Layson
Bryan Whitener
(202) 566-3100
"While significant progress has been made in election reform, a major challenge facing election officials is the ongoing need to recruit and retain poll workers" said EAC Chairman Paul DeGregorio. "We hope to engage America's college students in an effort to meet this critical need."
EAC will award up to $250,000 in competitive grant monies over the course of the project. Eligible applicants include institutions of higher education such as state universities, private colleges and community colleges, and non-profit organizations. The ceiling for individual awards is $20,000.
Applications are due no later than June 15, 2006 and must be submitted in hard copy by mail or hand delivery. For information on how to apply and to obtain application forms and instructions, please call 1-866-747-1471 or send an email to:
HAVACollegeProgram@eac.gov. For additional information, go to www.eac.gov.EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by HAVA. It is charged with administering payments to states and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, implementing election administration improvements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines and serving as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election administration. The four EAC commissioners are Paul DeGregorio, chairman; Ray Martinez III, vice chairman; Donetta Davidson and Gracia Hillman.
Internet Voting Op-Ed
There is an interesting opinion article from the Washington Post about two issues in elections. The hook is that 63.4 million people voted in the American Idol finals, which exceeds the number of voters who voted in the 2002 mid-term elections. The piece poses two questions:
First, why can't Americans vote in real elections using convenient voting methods, like the Internet, the telephone, or even cell phones. The article notes that there are pros and cons to this sort of convenience voting but we need to experiment with these technologies. (Note: This person clearly read our book Point, Click and Vote; that is recommendation one in our conclusions!)
Second, he discusses the idea allowing voters to cast multiple votes for each candidate. This sort of preference voting would allocate to each voter a set number of votes and then allow each voter to cast those votes. A voter could cast all of their votes for one candidate, spread their votes across more than one candidate, or cast a single vote and withhold the rest. This allows voters to vote their actual preferences. For example, if you are a Green but don't think they will win the election, you might vote one or two votes for the Green and then vote the remaining three for the voter you think will actually win.
The current political environment may not be the most conducive for experimentation but at some point, there will be pressure to do this and to move elections into the 21st Century.
P.S. -- Two notes. First, Mike reminded me that I blogged on the same IBM report that he did, which is either a sign of how good the IBM reports are or how bad my memory is. Second, Paul noted at the end of his blog on George Will that his recommendation sounds like something thought up by philosopher kings. For those of you who may not know this, Will is a PHD in political philosophy, so Will would likely appreciate philosopher kings!!!!
First, why can't Americans vote in real elections using convenient voting methods, like the Internet, the telephone, or even cell phones. The article notes that there are pros and cons to this sort of convenience voting but we need to experiment with these technologies. (Note: This person clearly read our book Point, Click and Vote; that is recommendation one in our conclusions!)
Second, he discusses the idea allowing voters to cast multiple votes for each candidate. This sort of preference voting would allocate to each voter a set number of votes and then allow each voter to cast those votes. A voter could cast all of their votes for one candidate, spread their votes across more than one candidate, or cast a single vote and withhold the rest. This allows voters to vote their actual preferences. For example, if you are a Green but don't think they will win the election, you might vote one or two votes for the Green and then vote the remaining three for the voter you think will actually win.
The current political environment may not be the most conducive for experimentation but at some point, there will be pressure to do this and to move elections into the 21st Century.
P.S. -- Two notes. First, Mike reminded me that I blogged on the same IBM report that he did, which is either a sign of how good the IBM reports are or how bad my memory is. Second, Paul noted at the end of his blog on George Will that his recommendation sounds like something thought up by philosopher kings. For those of you who may not know this, Will is a PHD in political philosophy, so Will would likely appreciate philosopher kings!!!!
Monday, May 29, 2006
Early voting on Memorial Day!
Indeed, at least one of the seventeen early voting locations in Los Angeles County was open for business on the Memorial Day holiday --- the one at the Jackie Robinson Center in Pasadena. This is an early voting location that I've observed at before, and written about in the past, so I won't go into much detail here, other than to note that the physical layout of this early voting was virtually identical to what I observed in 2005 California Special Election.
The one exception was how they were using the demonstration video. In the past, at this location, the demonstration voting machine was located near the entrance to the early voting site --- but was rarely used unless an early voter asked for a demonstration (in my observations). Today, they had set up the video in a very good location, next to the voter check-in station, but there were only two chairs in from of the video (unlike the rows of chairs observed in East LA and Monterey Park last week).
I showed up just before 10am, with my daughter. We were rapidly processed (so rapidly that we really didn't get a chance to watch the demonstration video through the entirety of the presentation!). We were given the chance to pick whichever machine we wanted, and since I had my daughter with me, I picked the machine set up for disabled voters so that she could sit at the chair and watch the voting process.
Generally speaking, voting on the Diebold device is straightforward (I've early voted using it many times before). But this was the first time using the VVPAT, and it was a somewhat complicated primary election ballot. Consequently, I made two mistakes (keep in mind that I'm supposed to be an expert about this stuff!). One was skipping a race (lt. governor) which I really did want to vote in --- and the other was mistakenly voting in a race that I did not want to cast a vote in. Perhaps it was the distraction of my daughter, perhaps it was the crowded ballot. But the bottom line is that I did not notice these mistakes until the summary screen!
At that point I decided to see what would happen with the VVPAT, and how it would handle the rejection of an incorrect ballot. So from the summary screen I selected the "print ballot" button at the bottom, and after waiting a few seconds, the VVPAT device roared to life and printed out the first handful of races. Indeed, there was the lt. governor race, with no selection indicated. So I hit "reject ballot", and the VVPAT roared to life again, scrolling my "rejected ballot" forward along the scroll. I went back to the lt. governor race and the other race I made a mistake in, corrected my mistakes, and repeated the process. The VVPAT roared to life (I use the word "roared" because it is LOUD!) and displayed my ballot for comparison to the video screen.
Here is where I do have one beef with this VVPAT device; as we have observed with other e-voting/VVPAT devices, there is a serious usability issue with how the printed and electronic ballots are displayed. They come up using different types and sizes of fonts, different presentations, and they really hard to compare. I'll have to consult with some of my VTP colleagues on how to quantify these problems and how we can measure them, but I can't say that I found it easy to try to compare the printed ballot with the electronic ballot displayed on the screen.
But it was very convenient to vote on Memorial Day, and it was fun to be able to take my daughter with me. I'm wondering how many people voted today, despite the relatively low participation rate in this primary election. It's not typically the case that we get to vote on holidays here in California, and this is an interesting test in a way of the election-day holiday concept. The staff at the Jackie Robinson site told me that they had "about 20" voters yesterday (Sunday); while I was there we observed three others voting (not including myself).
The one exception was how they were using the demonstration video. In the past, at this location, the demonstration voting machine was located near the entrance to the early voting site --- but was rarely used unless an early voter asked for a demonstration (in my observations). Today, they had set up the video in a very good location, next to the voter check-in station, but there were only two chairs in from of the video (unlike the rows of chairs observed in East LA and Monterey Park last week).
I showed up just before 10am, with my daughter. We were rapidly processed (so rapidly that we really didn't get a chance to watch the demonstration video through the entirety of the presentation!). We were given the chance to pick whichever machine we wanted, and since I had my daughter with me, I picked the machine set up for disabled voters so that she could sit at the chair and watch the voting process.
Generally speaking, voting on the Diebold device is straightforward (I've early voted using it many times before). But this was the first time using the VVPAT, and it was a somewhat complicated primary election ballot. Consequently, I made two mistakes (keep in mind that I'm supposed to be an expert about this stuff!). One was skipping a race (lt. governor) which I really did want to vote in --- and the other was mistakenly voting in a race that I did not want to cast a vote in. Perhaps it was the distraction of my daughter, perhaps it was the crowded ballot. But the bottom line is that I did not notice these mistakes until the summary screen!
At that point I decided to see what would happen with the VVPAT, and how it would handle the rejection of an incorrect ballot. So from the summary screen I selected the "print ballot" button at the bottom, and after waiting a few seconds, the VVPAT device roared to life and printed out the first handful of races. Indeed, there was the lt. governor race, with no selection indicated. So I hit "reject ballot", and the VVPAT roared to life again, scrolling my "rejected ballot" forward along the scroll. I went back to the lt. governor race and the other race I made a mistake in, corrected my mistakes, and repeated the process. The VVPAT roared to life (I use the word "roared" because it is LOUD!) and displayed my ballot for comparison to the video screen.
Here is where I do have one beef with this VVPAT device; as we have observed with other e-voting/VVPAT devices, there is a serious usability issue with how the printed and electronic ballots are displayed. They come up using different types and sizes of fonts, different presentations, and they really hard to compare. I'll have to consult with some of my VTP colleagues on how to quantify these problems and how we can measure them, but I can't say that I found it easy to try to compare the printed ballot with the electronic ballot displayed on the screen.
But it was very convenient to vote on Memorial Day, and it was fun to be able to take my daughter with me. I'm wondering how many people voted today, despite the relatively low participation rate in this primary election. It's not typically the case that we get to vote on holidays here in California, and this is an interesting test in a way of the election-day holiday concept. The staff at the Jackie Robinson site told me that they had "about 20" voters yesterday (Sunday); while I was there we observed three others voting (not including myself).
