Friday, June 16, 2006
New research on transparency and access to source code
We examine the potential role of source code disclosure and open source code requirements in promoting technical improvements and increasing transparency of voting systems. We describe the “enclosure of transparency” of voting technology that has occurred over the course of United States’ electoral history, the implications that source code disclosure has for transparency, the negative effects that enclosing transparency has had at different levels and the regulatory and legislative efforts to increase access to source code. We then look at the benefits and risks of open and disclosed source code regimes for voting systems, efforts to provide open source voting systems, existing open source business models that might translate to the voting systems context, regulatory and market barriers to disclosed or open source code in voting systems and alternatives that might exist outside of public disclosure of source code. We conclude that disclosure of full system source code to qualified individuals will promote technical improvements in voting systems while limiting some of the potential risks associated with full public disclosure.
I've only given the piece a quick read, but Hall does a good job in this piece in his summary of the pros and cons of the open-source argument as it has played out in recent years regarding electronic voting systems.
The two points I picked out of it upon my quick read were the following. One is that I couldn't find any discussion of another middle-ground open-source proposal, and that is the one made by the VTP back in 2001: "...the source code for all vote recording and vote counting processes must be open source. The source code for the user interface can and should be proprietary, so that vendors can develop their products" (p. 46). The second is a deeper question, that I'm not sure that Hall can answer in this particular paper --- who are the "qualified individuals", who appoints them and to whom are they accountable?
Voting systems, registration rolls, and voter turnout
During the class, I produced a precinct level map of voter turnout in Multnomah County, OR during the 2004 election. (I didn't save the map, but if anyone requests this, I can quickly produce one: paul.gronke@gmail.com.) My intent was to see where the votes come from in Multnomah County.
I am curious whether Portland's city wide election system (no districts) has an impact on the way that city services are provided. As a first cut, I want to see if votes correlate with donations correlate with provision of city services.
What I found was pretty amazing to a jaded political scientist. I knew turnout was high in Oregon, but turnout rates in my county ranged from a low of 78% in some areas to over 95% in others! What the heck is in the water out here?
There is another possibility, though--the voter rolls in Oregon are so clean that they lead us to overestimate participation. Let me remind readers how Oregon maintains its rolls.
- Approximately 18 days before the election, ballots are sent out to all registered voters. The postal service is prohibited from forwarding this mail.
- For all ballots that are returned undeliverable, the citizen is coded as "inactive" and a postcard reminder is sent.
- If the voter does not update the registration record, they remain inactive.
I'm not sure whether this is good or bad in the grand scheme of things, but I'm pretty sure that it results in voter turnout that is higher than other localities. I did a quick back of the envelope calculation, comparing the estimated number of citizens over 18 in Multnomah County (520,156) and the number of registered voters (372,017) = 71.5%.
Why is this relevant? Well, advocates of voting by mail routinely point to Oregon's high turnout as a reason to adopt the system. It promotes high levels of participation, so they argue. There are other reasons why turnout in Oregon is high (it has a participative culture, it is relatively homogeneous, there are low levels of poverty), but now I wonder whether there are institutional mechanisms that artificially inflate our turnout numbers.
Any help on this out there would be appreciated.
Thursday, June 15, 2006
EAC Guide to Implementing Voting Systems
WASHINGTON - The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) met today to discuss management guidelines to ensure the proper use of voting systems in conjunction with other critical aspects of the elections process. Commissioners also released EAC's Quick Start Management Guide, which describes processes and procedures for local election administrators to use when implementing new voting systems.
Commissioners heard from election officials, management and technical experts as they examined a range of election procedures such as equipment storage, security access, set up and operation, and the counting of votes. Panelists emphasized that proper training of election officials and poll workers is essential to maintain the security and reliability of voting equipment as well as overall confidence in the elections process.
The Quick Start Management Guide is a snapshot of procedures for election officials to use when introducing new voting systems. It highlights priority items essential to managing a successful election with a new voting system. It is a prelude to EAC's Election Management Guidelines (EMG), a comprehensive document of election administration practices and recommendations. The EMG is a multi-year project, with new portions being completed and released on a priority basis over the next several years.
"Many jurisdictions throughout the country are using new voting equipment, and all of us recognize the need to also introduce comprehensive procedures surrounding the set-up, operation and storage of that new equipment," said EAC Chairman Paul DeGregorio. "That is why we issued Quick Start, which provides an overview of management procedures for voting systems that can be put in place now." He noted that the first EMG module will be released later this year.
Initial EMG topics will cover information on voting system certification, security, and pre-election testing. Other topics to be addressed include procedures regarding statewide voter registration systems, voting system management, information technology, precinct definition, poll workers, polling places, military and overseas voters, facility management, office administration, voter outreach, and Election Day procedures and practices. The EMG will also complement the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, adopted by EAC in December, 2005.
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
Recounting VVPATs in the OC
Yesterday, I went to
Because so few recounts have been conducted to present using VVPAT, observing the
Pre-Recount Canvass and Ballot Accounting
The first step in the recount is the initial canvass and ballot accounting. In
The key to the reconciliation process is to examine the number of signatures in the poll roster and compare this to the number of machine access codes voted, which is equivalent to the number of ballots issued. This access code data is on the CRIBS form and also on the PTU, which lists every precinct by number and the number of ballots cast by precinct. The formula for the accounting process at this point is:
Number of Signatures = Number of Codes Voted.
Recount Process
Once the signatures and ballots cast have been reconciled, the County did a random sample of both precincts and races. A computer program generates the random selection for the one-percent precinct count. Then, the races not covered by the one-percent random count are selected to ensure that all races are covered by the recount.
Although
1. Generate a list of precincts and races to be recounted.
2. Find the bag containing the sealed VVPAT for the polling place in question. (In an election with consolidated precincts, the polling place has to be located all VVPATs examined to find only the votes for the precinct in question, as discussed below).
3. Remove all VVPAT printers from the bag.
4. Assign the VVPAT for the precinct in question to a counting team.
5. Have the team take each VVPAT, unseal it, unscrew the back, and open it.
6. Advance the VVPAT printer tape until the end of the voted tape is located. Cut the tape.
7. Reseal empty container and place it back into the precinct bag. The “unvoted” tape is still kept with the bag in case any issues arise.
8. Unroll all of the ballots from the tape and cut each ballot. (This part of the process could potentially be automated, with the correct technology, but at present, cutting the VVPATs into individual ballots makes sense).
9. Separate the ballots by precincts if the polling place had consolidated precincts.
10. Separate the “ballot accepted” from the “ballot rejected.”
11. Place all “ballot rejected” ballots into a separate envelope with the precinct number. Seal this envelope.
12. In a primary election, sort the ballots by party.
13. Stack the ballots and then, for each race, call the candidate on the ballot. (In a primary election, you first select a party and then, for each race, call the candidate on the ballot). If the voter made no selection, you call the no selections for accounting purposes.
14. The person calling the ballot then hands the called ballot to the observer, who verifies the call.
15. The observer then sorts the called ballots into piles for each candidate (including a “no selection” pile).
16. Two individuals separately tally the called ballot.
17. Once all ballots for a race have been called, the team then compares the tally totals on the two tally sheets.
18. If these two numbers are the same, the team then compares the tally with the number of VVPAT ballots in the piles for each candidate.
19. If these two totals are the same, the team then verifies the tally against the “unofficial results,” which list the vote total recorded by the voting machines by precinct by candidate for early voting and Election Day voting. (Note: the one-percent count of VVPATs only verifies Election Day totals).
If, at the end of this process the totals do not match and a re-check by the team cannot determine the cause of the problem, the senior election staff take the VVPAT ballots, along with the roster and the electronic ballot storage card, and re-examine the precinct’s totals.
Team Dynamics
As was noted implicitly above, the counting of the VVPATs is done by teams of four:
- One person calls the candidate for the race being counted.
- One person checks that the correct name was counted and piles the ballots by candidate.
- Two people independently tally (using “tick” marks on a tally sheet) each time a candidates name is called.
Across the eight teams, there was variation in how effectively each team worked together. The two most effective teams had the following characteristics:
- The team members had worked together before. In one case, the workers represented the members of a precinct Election Day poll worker team that also works pre- and post-election. In the other case, the individuals have worked a post-election audit and manual recount previously and all like working together.
- Someone was in charge on the team. Although there is no official “leader” on each team, one individual needs to be someone to whom everyone will listen and knows how to handle various situations that arise.
- They work efficiently. The team members have to develop a rhythm to the work and move efficiently through the process. The euphemism “Slow and steady wins the race,” is apropos here.
- They knew what they were doing and why they were doing it. The effective teams had workers who understood exactly what they were doing, how to follow the process, and the underlying rationale for why the recount was being conducted.
Interestingly, the teams that were most ineffective were those that were comprised of multiple individuals who work as the lead person in a polling place. This might seem counter-intuitive; it would be reasonable to think that a team of lead polling place people would include the best people possible. However, the problem that arises is that these teams have too many people who wanted to be in charge and not enough people who are willing to follow the lead. As a result, these teams often became bogged down in debates over minutiae about how to handle problems.
Tuesday, June 13, 2006
Election administration personnel changes announced today
First, EAC commissioner Ray Martinez agreed to stay on at the Election Assistance Commission, until they could find a replacement. (Press release linked from electionline.org).
Second, Dean Logan, head of elections in King County, announced that he was leaving King County to take up a position in Los Angeles County, the deputy registrar.
While I don't have any way to quantify this claim, it does seem to me as if we are seeing an increasing number of election administrators leave their profession, and a lot of job mobility by election officials. Would certainly make for an interesting study!
Monday, June 12, 2006
"Voices of Reform" call for redistricting reform in California
The heart of the letter to the Governor included this joint "Statement in Support of Redistricting Reform":
We believe that the inherent conflict of interest that results from legislators directly determining the shape of the districts for which they or other members of their party will compete in future elections contributes to the erosion of public confidence in government, undermines genuine political representation and has the potential to negatively affect the quality of public policy.
Therefore, we support steps to eliminate this conflict of interest and related incentives to create non-competitive, safe seats, while strengthening the overall integrity of the legislative redistricting process.
Achieving these goals should include, at a minimum, the following actions:
1) Establish a process that is representative of the state’s diversity for appointing an independent redistricting commission balanced in partisan representation;
2) Establish a transparent and inclusive process for the independent commission to integrate public comment into the redistricting process. This should include public meetings throughout the state and timely public access to any substantive material under consideration by the commission;
3) Ensure the independent commission complies fully with the Voting Rights Act and equal population requirements; and
4) Ensure clear guidelines are established directing the commission to respect traditional redistricting criteria including (but not limited to) respect for communities of similar social, cultural, ethnic, geographic, or economic interest, respect for city and county boundaries, and formation of contiguous districts.
Anyone who has ever tried to develop consensus language on a subject as touchy as redistricting can guess at how hard and long the process was that led about a hundred prominent California leaders, from all across the political spectrum and representing all walks of California life, to agree to the language in this letter. It just shows how hard the "Voices of Reform" staff works (and how good they), and how important this issue is to many prominent Californians.
"Voices of Reform" maintains a very informative website, and I'll update as additional elements of this project's reform agenda are elaborated.
More on Sequoia Voting Systems ownership debate
Dear Mike & Thad –
Thanks for the opportunity to respond to points raised in you June 3rd ElectionUpdates blog post and a Los Angeles Times article from that same date about Sequoia Voting Systems and its ownership.
Sequoia Voting Systems is an American company, based in Oakland, California that has successfully operated in the United States supplying election technology and services to state and local election entities in 20 states for over 100 years. In addition, the vast majority of Sequoia’s election technology is manufactured in New York State by the company’s two manufacturing partners: Harvard Custom Manufacturing and Jaco Electronics.
Sequoia has operated in the U.S. under foreign ownership for the last 24 years. From 1982 – 2002, Sequoia had an Irish parent company – Jefferson Smurfit Group PLC, and from 2002-2005, Sequoia had a British parent company – De La Rue PLC. In 2005, Smartmatic Corporation, a U.S. company, incorporated in Delaware and based in Boca Raton, Florida, purchased Sequoia from De La Rue.
Smartmatic Corporation is owned by Smartmatic International Holding B.V., a Netherlands corporation. Smartmatic Int’l Holding serves as a holding company for the Smartmatic Group’s operational businesses, which include companies organized and located in Venezuela, Barbados and Mexico and offices in Taiwan and Boca Raton. Smartmatic Int’l Holding B.V. is in turn owned by Smartmatic International Group N.V., a holding company with no separate business operations organized in the Netherlands Antilles.
Approximately 97% of Smartmatic is owned by its four founders – Antonio Mugica Rivero (a citizen of both Spain and Venezuela), Roger Pinate (a citizen of Venezuela), Alfredo Anzola (a citizen of Venezuela) and Jorge Massa (a citizen of France and Venezuela) – through personal trusts and private foundations in which they hold the beneficial interest. The remaining 2.89% of Smartmatic is owned by key employees of Smartmatic and family and acquaintances of the founders.
No foreign government or officials thereof have any ownership interest, directly or indirectly, in Sequoia or any of the Smartmatic entities. The corporate and ownership structure of the company was established in large measure to provide fiscally efficient results across multiple jurisdictions in which the firms do business and is modeled after similar approaches used by well known multinational firms.
Sequoia has always been open, honest and communicative with our customers and constituents on this and all matters, and will continue to conduct ourselves in this manner to help answer questions and alleviate concerns. For more detailed information on Sequoia’s ownership structure and other related questions about Smartmatic, please see this area of Sequoia’s website - http://www.sequoiavote.com/article.php?id=74. You can also visit Smartmatic’s website at www.smartmatic.com to learn more about the company.
In your June 3rd post, you stated that the “broader problem is a lack of transparency throughout the vendor-administrator relationship” and you list types of information about election suppliers and procurements that you would like to see compiled and made available to the public and researchers so that everyone would have access to this type of information with transparency as the goal.
While compiling this information and formulating some type of clearinghouse is a worthy goal (and a daunting task!), I believe it would still not satisfy the majority of those who have concerns about the actual transparency of this country’s electoral process, many of which can be alleviated through education about the specific voting equipment used in jurisdictions, the state’s certification process, the individual jurisdiction’s selection process for procuring equipment as well as through active civic participation locally by interested citizens. It is also important to note that a great deal of the information referenced is already available, albeit in a wide variety of disparate locations, and much of what you mentioned is often required for vendors to disclose when responding to Requests for Proposals from various government entities.
In light of this discussion, however, I believe it is important to drill down to the following points and remind people of these facts when thinking about election transparency:
• Election technology providers do not conduct elections in this country; state and local election officials conduct elections. State and local election officials purchase equipment from vendors, including training, project management, Election Day site support, etc., but elections are managed by each jurisdiction’s election officials in conjunction with staff members and poll workers who perform admirably in service of our country and its voters.
• U.S. voting systems are subject to comprehensive, rigorous and objective testing and verification at the state and federal levels, including a line-by-line review of their software source code by Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs), prior to use in an election by U.S. jurisdictions. One example of this thorough certification testing of voting equipment at the state level can be found in the State of California. Very detailed test results and certification information on voting technology providers certified in California can be found on the Secretary of State’s website at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm.
• Equipment testing and election auditing undertaken at the local level includes pre- and post election testing of equipment, logic & accuracy testing, parallel monitoring, canvassing, state mandated recounts of a certain percentage of votes, chain of custody review. Local election officials have important procedures in place to ensure the accuracy and security of the elections they are tasked with administering.
• Approximately 25 states require will require the use of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) in time for the 2008 presidential election according to “Recounts: From Punch Cards to Paper Trails”, a February 2006 publication from electionline.org. This combination of electronic voting and a paper audit trail reviewed by voters should go a long way in providing a redundant and secure voting record that avoids any questions about the integrity of electoral results.
We appreciate that Ms. Shafer took the time to send us this lengthy response, and hope that her thoughts help continue this discussion in a positive direction.
Answers: forwarding vote by mail ballots
- "The problem for the voter in the first scenario is that the ballot may not contain the issues on which the voter is now eligible to vote. The ballot envelope is clearly marked using postal verbiage that the ballot is NOT to be forwarded and the internal post office is not doing thevoter a favor by forwarding the ballot."
(Note: still not clear whether they are breaking the law.)
- " Under number two, there are multiple issues. If the son or daughter is temporarily away from home -- at school, on an overseas trip, mission activity, or on a temporary job -- the voter would be better served if we were provided with an absentee address. At any rate, the ballot he or she receives would be correct as long as the home address is the voter's residence for voting purposes. On the other hand, if the son or daughter now "lives" somewhere else, he or she should vote a ballot with issuesbased on the new residence and should re-register to vote."
- Interesting, Oregon only twist: "Double majority issues could also play into these scenarios and if residence challenges were presented, we would have to look into them."
CA early voting continues to climb
reports absentee ballot rates at 60 percent, a figure that the county clerk expects to climb. Overall turnout is roughly the same as in 2002.
Click here for a nice PDF that compares turnout over time in San Luis Obispo county.
