Category Archives: election administration

Must-Read for Election Officials: "State of Alaska Election Security Project Reports"

I’ve been meaning for some time to post a link to these reports produced by the University of Alaska-Anchorage: “State of Alaska Election Security Project Phase 1 Report;” and the “State of Alaska Election Security Project Phase 2 Report.” The Phase 1 report was published in late December 2007, and I was a peer reviewer of that report. The Phase 2 report was published in May 2008.

The reason I say that this work is a must-read is that it is more than just the typical security review of voting technologies; the Alaska-Anchorage team took a broader perspective, and argued strongly for studying voting systems in their policy and procedural context. Here is a long quote from the Phase 1 report:

The report is an overview-level evaluation of recent studies and a determination of their relevance to Alaska’s systems, technologies, and procedures. It is the first part of a multi-phase project to evaluate the security of Alaska’s election system.(footnote deleted). The research includes a detailed study of the evaluation reports from California, Florida, Maryland, Ohio and Connecticut, a review of the response to the California study by equipment provider Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) , and an overview of Alaska’s election laws and procedures. The team conducted interviews with members of the University of California and Florida State University evaluation teams, with officials from the State of Alaska Division of Elections, and with election officials from California, Florida and Connecticut. As a result of this Phase 1 work, the research team identified areas within the election system and equipment used that warrant further analysis necessary to develop more definitive conclusions.

California, Florida, Connecticut, Maryland and Ohio conducted their studies using equipment that is also used in Alaska. These evaluations found serious technical vulnerabilities in the systems studied. Most reports also point out that procedures have the potential to either mitigate or exacerbate vulnerabilities
reported at the equipment level. Many of these items have been proactively flagged by the officials in the Division of Elections. As appropriate, they have implemented measures and identified possible approaches to address some of these vulnerabilities.

Each state in the US can adopt processes and procedures to meet their unique requirements. They can also select from a range of vendors and equipment provided federal certification standards have been met. Given the wide range of implementations, it is critically important that all system and procedural issues be investigated carefully in the context of policies and procedures in place in the state in which they are evaluated. In Alaska, this approach is essential to determine what, if any, impacts these issues have on the security of elections in Alaska. The use of paper ballots as the primary record of votes, the procedures for hand recounts and the uniform practices across the state may reduce vulnerabilities in Alaska elections.

The Phase 2 report implements this approach, and issues a long list of recommendations that are well-worth reading.

Live from the Pac NW Elections Conference 2: the spotlight hurts

My next update from the Pac NW Elections conference concerns election “storms”–specifically, the 2004 Washington State governor’s race and the infamous 13th congressional district race in Florida.

We saw two panels that dealt with these elections.

  • Nick Handy, Washington’s State Director of Elections, John Pearson, retired Deputy Dir. of Elections, and Evelyn Arnold, Chelan County Auditor spoke on the first panel.
  • Bill Cowles, Orange County FL Supervisor of Elections (and IACREOT President elect) and Kathy Dent, Sarasota County Clerk spoke on the second panel.

These panelists had a lot to say, and I won’t summarize everything here (I’m hoping to get my hands on some of these powerpoints). Some of the high points were:

  • Ballot tracking and reconciliation is key. Every official in both states agreed that careful ballot tracking procedures are the way to avoid challenges.
  • Document, document, document. The possibility of election recounts and challenges makes it necessary for officials to keep very good records
  • And don’t document. Don’t write anything in email that you don’t want to have to explain in open court.

In the end, what struck me is how these panels turned into something like support sessions for these officials. These elections hurt. Local elections officials are not ready for the media spotlight (a lot of conversations in the conference have turned to media relations), and are definitely not ready for activist-driven scrutiny of their procdures–and accusations regarding their professionalism and non-partisanship.