The Pew Research Center For the People and The Press, in conjunction with The Associated Press, recently released the results of a survey study of who votes, who doesn’t, and who does only intermittently. Here’s a snapshot of the study’s main findings:

hey vote ­ but not always. Compared with Americans who regularly cast ballots, they are less engaged in politics. They are more likely to be bored with the political process and admit they often do not know enough about candidates to cast ballots. But they are crucial to Republican and Democratic fortunes in the Nov. 7 midterm elections.

They are the intermittent voters: Americans who are registered to vote but do not always make it to the polls. They differ significantly from those who vote regularly. For one thing, they’re less likely to be married than are regular voters. Intermittent voters also are more mistrustful of people compared with those who vote regularly. They also are less angry with government, though no less dissatisfied with President Bush than are regular voters, according to a survey conducted Sept. 21-Oct. 4 among 1,804 adults by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press in collaboration with the Associated Press.

The survey also finds large differences between Americans who are not registered to vote or vote only rarely, and intermittent or regular voters. The two groups at the bottom of the voting participation scale are much less likely than regular or intermittent voters to believe that voting will make much of a difference. They also are less likely to agree with the statement: “I feel guilty when I don’t get a chance to vote.”

To understand who votes and who doesn’t, survey respondents were divided into four groups based on their voting history, attitudes about voting, and interest in the current campaign. Together, these groups span the breadth of political participation, from regular voters to democracy’s bystanders(1):

Regular voters. These are adults who are currently registered to vote. Nearly all regular voters cast ballots in the 2004 presidential election; most say they “always” vote and that they are certain to vote in the upcoming congressional election. Together, they constitute roughly a third (35%) of the adult population.

Intermittent voters. All intermittent voters say they are registered to vote, but fewer acknowledge always voting. They report less certainty of voting in the upcoming election and less interest in the campaign compared with regular voters. Intermittent voters make up 20% of the population.

Registered but rare voters. About a quarter of Americans say they are registered to vote, but acknowledge that they rarely make it to the polls (23%). Fully three-quarters (76%) say they sometimes feel they don’t know enough about the candidates to vote.

Unregistered adults. These are Americans who say they are not registered to vote, or indicate their registration may have lapsed. They comprise 22% of the population.

Interesting stuff, and important research for those who are intereted in efforts to increase voter participation.

It’s a perfect Halloween story, a study by the Poughkepsie Journal alleges that as many as 77,000 dead people are on the New York statewide voter registry, and as many as 2,600 of them might have voted from the grave.

Here’s more from this creepy story:

A new statewide database of registered voters contains as many as 77,000 dead people on its rolls, and as many as 2,600 of them have cast votes from the grave, according to a Poughkeepsie Journal computer-assisted analysis.

The Journal’s analysis of New York’s 3-month-old database is the first to determine the potential for errors and fraud in voting. It matched names, dates of birth and ZIP codes in the state’s database of 11.7 million voter registration records against the same information in the Social Security Administration’s “Death Master File.” That database has 77 million records of deaths dating back to 1937.

The state database was current as of Oct. 4, the master death index through June.

And they also found that:

– There were dead people on the voter rolls in all of New York’s 62 counties and people in as many as 45 counties who had votes recorded after they had died.

– One Bronx address was listed as the home for as many as 191 registered voters who had died. The address is 5901 Palisade Ave., in Riverdale, site of the Hebrew Home for the Aged.

– Democrats who cast votes after they died outnumbered Republicans by more than 4 to 1. The reason: Most of them came from Democrat-dominated New York City, where the higher population produced more matches.

But the story does note that the instances of people seemingly voting from the grave appear to be instances of clerical error or other mistakes, not direct evidence of election fraud in New York. These numbers do provide some metrics on the the accuracy of statewide voter registries, however.

Confirming rumors I’ve been hearing, the Miami Herald is reporting today that a U.S. Treasury Department entity, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, is spearheading an investigation of the ownership structure of Sequoia Voting Systems, in particular, links to Venezuelans close to Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. The CFIUS focuses on situations where foreign investment in U.S. corporations might impact U.S. national security.

As the story reported:

Federal officials are investigating whether Smartmatic, owner of Oakland, Calif.-based Sequoia Voting Systems, is secretly controlled by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, according to two people familiar with the probe.

In July, a Treasury Department spokeswoman disclosed that a Treasury-led panel had contacted Smartmatic, and a company representative said his firm was ”in discussions” with the panel. At the time, those discussions were informal. The government has now upgraded to a formal investigation, the two sources said.

…

The probe stems from a May 4 letter to the Treasury Department by Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-N.Y., raising concerns about Smartmatic’s purchase of Sequoia last year. Maloney said she was disturbed by a 2004 article in The Miami Herald revealing that the Venezuelan government owned 28 percent of Bizta — a company operated by two of the same people who own Smartmatic. Bizta bought back those shares after the article appeared, and Smartmatic now characterizes the deal as a loan.

Bizta and Smartmatic had partnered with Venezuelan telephone giant CANTV to win a $91 million contract to supply electronic voting machines for Venezuelan elections, including the controversial 2004 referendum Chávez won.

Smartmatic categorically denies any link to the Chávez regime. ”Smartmatic is a privately held corporation, and no foreign government or entity — including Venezuela — has ever held an ownership stake in the company,” Mitch Stoller, a company spokesman, said in an e-mail to The Miami Herald.

There is a paper by Valentina Bali and Brian Silver (both from Michigan State University), that was recently published in the journal State Politics and Policy Quarterly (Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2006, pages 21-48). This paper, “Politics, Race, and American State Electoral Reforms after Election 2000”, looks at the political and fiscal factors that are associated with state election reform efforts after the 2000 presidential election.

Bali and Silver look at state election reform efforts in 2001 and 2002 (that is, after the 2000 presidential election, but before HAVA passage and implementation). They use two different methodological approaches, and a multivariate statistical model that includes a variety of political, fiscal, and other possible correlates of state efforts to implement election reform, pre-HAVA. In summary, Bali and Silver find:

Taken together, the models in Tables 1 and 2 suggest the following about the influences on state electoral reform after the troubled 2000 election. Having a close partisan electoral balance hindered a state’s chances of passing any electoral reforms (Hypothesis 5), while having a divided government enhanced its chances of adopting more restrictive electoral policy. Partisan control of state government had only a main effect on voting barrier reforms, while Republican-controlled states were more likely to restrict voter access (Hypothesis 3). We also found evidence of a strategic link between Republican control and Hispanic representation across several reforms, with Republican controlled states with a larger Hispanic population adopting less restrictive electoral reforms (Hypothesis 2). The main effect of racial composition was mixed, although the models using the summary index suggest a tendency to adopt more restrictive electoral laws when the proportion of blacks in a state was high (Hypothesis 3). Legislative institutions and fiscal constraints had little impact on electoral reform (Hypotheses 6 and 8), although previous electoral laws efforts, as measured by the base objective needs variables, did influence the adoption of several of the reforms (Hypothesis 1). Term limits did not have an impact in any of the election reform adoption models (Hypothesis 7) and so we excluded it from the analyses.

They then look at state-by-state efforts in 2003 to implement HAVA-compliant legislation, using a multivariate statisical model much like the one they used for the 2001-2002 analysis of pre-HAVA reform efforts. Oddly, they only find that one factor — legislative professionalism — has a statistical association with passage of HAVA-compliant legislation in 2003, and it had a negative effect on HAVA-compliance (that is, more professional legislatures were less likely to pass HAVA-compliant legislation, which Bali and Silver argue is due to greater independence of more professionalized legislatures and some weak evidence that more professionalized legislatures were more likely to pass election reform before 2003). Generally, they argue that the inability of their model to explain the degree to which states passed HAVA-compliant legislation in 2003 may arise because a number of states passed significant reforms before HAVA.

All in all, an interesting analysis for those who are interested in studying state efforts to implement election reform. Of course, it would be a productive research exercise to extend this analysis through 2006, as election reform is still a work-in-progress in many states (and is likely to be so for the near future).

From Polk County, NC local officials estimate as many early voters this year (a midterm contest) as in the 2004 election.

From Denver, CO the county director estimates that more than half the ballots will come in early (in person and absentee).

From Racine, WI the number of absentee ballots already exceeds the total received in the 2002 gubernatorial race.

The area surrounding Chattanooga, TN, in contrast, reports heavy but not record breaking early turnout. County officials speculate that voters are “getting used to” early voting.

Yesterday the Orange County (CA) district attorney charged eleven individuals regarding a voter registration fraud scheme, in which the partisan registration status of voters was changed. Currently, there are 37 instances of this happening as a result of this scheme in the OC, according to the Los Angeles Times:

The voter registration charges cover at least 37 instances in which Democratic and Green Party voters and even one noncitizen were registered as Republicans. Each defendant was charged with felony counts of fraudulent completion of registration affidavits. The defendants are all low-level workers who circulated registration cards.

Here are some additional details about the scheme:

The Orange County district attorney’s office has charged 11 people with fraudulent voter registration stemming from a Republican registration drive this year that resulted in dozens of Democrats unwittingly being signed up as Republicans.

Those charged had been paid as much as $10 for each voter they registered as part of a Republican Party effort to recruit more voters in central Orange County. The area includes the district represented by Democratic Rep. Loretta Sanchez, a regular target of Republicans, and a competitive state Senate race.

There is a famous Estonian blogger here — The Tehnokratt — who has posted many of the powerpoints on his website. Although the website is in Estonian, the powerpoints and two audit files are listed under the heading Friday October 26, 2006, “e-Hääletamine ja valimised infoühiskonnas.” I would especially recommend Alexander Trechsel‘s and Michael Remmert‘s presentations.

Jonathan Stonestreet.works with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. He discussed election observation. The OSCE views the key of a democratic society is that there are periodic, genuine, free, and fair elections, with universal and equal suffrage, conducted by secret ballot. The OSCE argues that observers enhance integrity. The OSCE observation methodology has been used internationally and allows for comparability of elections in different contexts.

In general, the OSCE thinks that any voting process must all adhere to OSCE commitments and new election technologies should not infringe upon these commitments. Observers have to look at an array of issues, from machine procurement and certification to election worker training and the provisions for audits. The importance of technology is that technologies can impact the resolution of election disputes, perceptions of the vote, the secrecy of the vote, and the transparency of the process.

Election observation is important to ensuring free and fair elections, as is evidence that shows that all election processes work accuracy. The voting machines should produce evidence that votes are cast and counted accurately but do so in a way that maintains secrecy. There are several issues that Jonathan pointed to directly that observers need to be able to observe:

• Voting system certification and testing
• Secrecy of the vote
• Machine security
• Accessibility
• Education and training.
• Manual audit capacity.
• Accountability.
• Legal framework.
• Observer access.

He noted that such standards hold true for all voting systems. Interestingly, he specifically noted a problem in state laws, which is that the legal framework for voter-verified paper audit trails have to be exceedingly clear about which form of the ballot—the electronic or paper—is supreme. I would note that we do not generally meet other OSCE standards for election observation, such as allowing observers into polling places and the like (such activities are placed in the hands of parties, not independent organizations.)

The OSCE report on election observation can be found here.

The second panel examines the legal and constitutional issues associated with e-voting. Dr. Jordi Esteve, a professor of law at the Universidad de Leon, talked about the audit problem in elections. He noted that there are an array of legal questions—freedom, equality, secrecy, and the like—but auditability is perhaps the most important aspect of the process because it is auditability that gives confidence to the voting process. He does think, however, that there are ways to balance the problem of auditability with other measures.

Consider the traditional voting system. You have opaque ballot boxes and public tally which equals easy citizen control. A private, parallel tally can be conducted and compared to the official results. (Note here he is NOT talking about the American system, where ballots are counted electronically and often centrally tallied.) Now, consider the electronic vote. Here you have a black box, where the technician plays a critical role and it is difficult for the citizen to verify the results.

What do the audit measures for electronic voting look like? One is very familiar to the American audience—the paper trail. Jordi noted the Venezuelan experience with the VVPAT on the Smartmatic system where they conducted a post-election audit of a random sample of paper trails. With e-voting, here specifically Internet voting, he noted the Scytl model of providing an alphanumeric receipt that allows for the vote that the ballot as received by the electoral board. However, this still maintains a high technician role in the election.

This high level of involvement of technicians raises the question of whether independent audits are possible with e-voting. Jordi notes that there is not a common answer to this question among computer scientists—although many are skeptical it can be done—and that even if it can be done, it will be done by technicians, not citizens.

The problem of transparency is problematic also for other voting methods and we tolerate these problems. There are lax rules for postal voting, for example, in Spain and Switzerland. Spaniards also do not cast secret ballots on paper, which raises issues as well. These cases illustrate how certain nations have political or electoral cultures that prefer not to adopt and follow common rules for elections. This social approach to understanding elections suggests that, in some countries, the lost of control over the electoral process among citizens can be accepted if there are clear benefits, such as enfranchising new voters or increasing turnout.

Michael Remmert, who is the project manager for the Council of Europe’s “Good Governance in the Information Society” initiative, discussed the e-democracy initiatives at the Council. There are legal and declarative issues related to e-government that have been made by the Council. The council has already developed an “Internet Literacy Handbook” that is a model for member states on how to educate citizens about the Internet and its benefits and risks. The Council’s recommendations on e-voting include:

• providing and ensuring interoperability for e-voting systems;
• developing minimum standards for e-voting;
• providing a checklist for all states of the e-voting electoral process; and
• applying the principles of democratic elections to e-voting.

E-voting must be as reliable and secure as democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means. E-voting should be an additional and optional voting channel. Certifying voting systems is also a key component of this work.

Consider the breadth of work on e-voting in Europe. There have been binding pilots in Switzerland, Estonia, the UK, and France. A binding pilot will be done in the Netherlands in November. There have been nonbinding pilots in Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. There have been reports on e-voting in Ireland, Norway, and Lithuania. There is work on e-voting protection profiles in Germany. He noted specifically the use of e-voting for expatriates, something that Mike and I have touted as important for the United States.

The pilots on e-voting have proven that:

1. e-voting is feasible.

2. it is responsive to modern lifestyles and liked by users.

3. popular demand for it is not tremendously strong at present.

4. there is a democratic debate about the appropriateness of e-voting.

In order to have broad acceptance of e-voting, there needs to be a broad and open dialogue with all stakeholders—including voters, politicians, political parties, and public authorities.

E-voting requires a legal basis. States should consider creating laws that facilitate pilot testing of e-voting reforms and election reforms generally. Pilot tests also require pilots that start small and grow over time. It also requires research and systematic studies of the pilots.

Alexander Trechsel presented the results of his study on Estonian local elections in 2005. The goal of the study was determining who votes over the Internet, explain the choice of the vote channel, what is the impact on participation, and does it have political effects, enfranchising one side or another in a biased manner? He did a survey with three samples of voters: e-voters, traditional voters, and non-voters.

The older voters are much less likely to e-vote and the young are more likely to e-vote. However, e-voting did make a slight, but not statistically significant, difference in moving voters who only voted from time to time to vote in the municipal elections. Most voters who cast ballots online would have voted anyway but 15 percent or so would not have voted without the Internet. E-voting was chosen by 75 percent of voters because of its convenience, speed, and simplicity. Another 20 percent voted online because of the novelty. Non-e-voters did not vote online because they viewed it as complex—many had no access—but very few failed to e-vote because of security concerns.

They then estimated three models to determine the factors that shaped e-voting use and impact in Estonia.

• In a socio-demographic model—examining e-voting use using demographic variables—they found that e-voting use can be explained by age, education, income, and language (Russians voted less).

• When you examine a political model—which focuses on ideology and trust in government—the more you have trust in government the more you are prone to vote and trust in the state you are more likely to vote online.

• In a ICT model (Internet Communication and Technology), the computer literacy of the voter increased Internet voting, as did trust in internet transactions and trust in procedures in voting.

• In a full model, with all three models included, language made a very large difference, with Russian speaking Estonians, computing knowledge and trust in e-voting very important variables. All political variables and most socio-demographic variables lose significance. Age interesting variable; young people used the Internet more, but there is an important body of older, computer literate people who really want to vote using the Internet. Knowledgeable older voters choose to vote online at relative large rates, all things being equal.

Alexander notes three key aspects of his results:

• First, it is computer knowledge, not internet access, that boosts the use of Internet voting.
  
  
• Second, trust in e-voting is central to the use of e-voting.
  

• Third, the non-results are also important: the demographic factors are relevant but not significant in the analysis of the 2005 experience with e-voting.

Alexander closed by making a set of recommendations:

1. Internet communications and technology are important for e-voting. As you develop other aspects of the information society, it will improve electronic voting.
2. The Estonian model can serve as a best practice in many regards for nations around the world.
3. Language inclusiveness is important for making e-voting work well and be fair for all citizens.
4. There is also a need to extend the voting period for e-voting so that the process of e-voting is more effective. This would make e-voting in Estonia more closely resemble e-voting in Switzerland.