Earlier this spring, Eric Fischer (Congressional Research Service) sent me a link to a paper that he and Kevin Coleman wrote, “Voter Registration Systems.” It’s an insightful analysis of the characteristics of a voter registration system, and of how the states are doing regarding implementation of their statewide voter registries.

The most interesting part of the Fischer-Coleman analysis is their conclusion. They argue in their conclusion that there are three things now missing from any consensus on what might constitute a successful implementation of a statewide voter registration system under HAVA:

1. A lack of national standards for voter registration systems.
2. A lack of consensus measures for voter system performance (they provide at least eight measures).
3. A lack of means for gathering data on performance relative to these metrics.

Is this the place where I say “we told you so?”

Seriously, Fischer and Coleman are right on the money here. We lack national standards, clear and concise performance metrics, and methods for gathering data regarding performance relative to those metrics. While there is increasing pressure being placed on the Election Assistance Commission for voter registration database standards and for them to implement better data collection practices, it is not clear when we might have national voter registration system standards nor when we will see the collection of detailed and consistent data on implementation and performance of statewide voter registration systems.

I recently had a chance to read a very short, helpful and approachable report from the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the concept of national identification systems. The report, “IDs — Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems” — has actually been around for a few years (published in 2002), but the questions it raises about national identification systems are quite relevant today, especially for the concept of a national voter identification system.

In fact, I thought that many of the questions the report raises are highly relevant for the developing statewide voter identification and authentication systems in many states.

The report, like many NAS studies, isn’t about providing solutions. Instead, it is focused on raising important questions that should be asked about identification systems. The report categorizes the questions into three basic types: legal, policy, and technological.

My take is that anyone who is interested in the debate over voter identification systems would be well-served to read this report, especially the chapter on policy considerations. There, the basic questions posed by the NAS panel are for policymaker consideration of any proposed identification system are:

1. What is the purpose of the system?
2. What is the scope of the population that would be included in the proposed identification system?
3. What is the scope of the data that would be included in the identification system’s database, or which could eventually be related to data in the identification system in the future?
4. Who are the users of the system?
5. What types of usage of the identification system would be allowed?
6. Would participation in the identification system be mandatory or voluntary?
7. What legal systems are in place to protect the integrity of the data, the privacy and rights of those who have information in the system, and for resolving liability for misuse or failure of the identification system?

Of course, the report goes into detailed discussion of these questions, as well as questions about the legal and technological issues of identification systems.

For the two or three of our readers who may be interested in public financing of elections, campaign donations, and urban politics in Portland, OR, this posting on a progressive blog is interesting.

Using a combination of a public reporting system and Google maps, the poster has mapped campaign donations for three different candidates, two of whom solicited 1000 $5 donations (in order to qualify for public financing), and one who is raising money the old fashioned way.

(There is a nice project on public financing going on at the University of Wisconsin.

Another place to find “mashups” of geo-coded data and maps is at googlemapsmania.blogspot.com. Want to find who your neighbors gave money to in 2004? Click here to find out all the dirty details.

A cute personal story from Wichita Falls, TX describes the problems that a voter encounters when faced with a paper ballot from the “olden times.”

Apparently, election officials had to resort to paper ballots when the voting systems vendor, Elections Systems and Software, was unable to deliver ballot machines on time.

So what sort of problems did voters encounter? The folded paper ballot was too bulky to fit into the slot!

Times Record News

Here’s a similar story from Baxter County, Arkansas.

Election officials in Hamilton, Ohio discuss the new administrative burdens of no-excuse absentee balloting, occurring for the first time in this state. The county is having to accomodate not just a dramatic increase in paper ballots (via absentee voting) but also new electronic voting machines.

As we saw recently in Illinois, implementing a number of administrative changes at once is not a recipe for success.

Middletown Journal story

The latest installment of my series of opinion columns on election reform came out this morning, a call for the development of open primaries in California.

Here is the basic argument:

But we can return to a truly open primary in ways that will withstand legal challenge. One possibility is to again let voters cast ballots for all candidates running for office, regardless of their party, in most contests. But the two top-vote getters from the primary – no matter their party label – would face off in the fall general election. Such a system, if it did not apply to presidential races or party central committee offices, should pass constitutional muster.

…

But we now have an opportunity to revisit primary election reform. It turns out that two of the three main candidates running for governor (Democratic candidate Steve Westly and Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger) supported this type of open primary reform.

So we need to ask our gubernatorial candidates what they will to do fix our ailing electoral system and to make sure they continue to support opening up our primaries, even if it is contrary to the interests of the entrenched party elite.

Better yet, Westly and Schwarzenegger should push the Legislature to pass serious election reform this year, including opening up the primaries. Voters need real choices in primary elections, and we must reform the primary process to reduce the extreme polarization of our state’s politics.

The Ohio elections yesterday had some interesting incidents.

STRIKE ONE. Not surprisingly, a polling placein Cuyahoga County did not open on time because poll workers failed to show up. It was not until 1:00, more than 6 and a half hours after it was supposed to! As a consquence, the Associated Press notes that “Common Pleas Judge Nancy McDonnell issued an order to keep the polling site open until 9:30 p.m. at the request of U.S. Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones.” Mike and I have written before about the problems associated with poll site voting and this is an example of the problems at arise. People get potentially disenfranchised because of the actions of temporary workers.

STRIKE TWO: This is so weird I am going to copy it from WKYC in full:

CLEVELAND — At a voting location on Jennings Road, a voter there took his rage out on an electronic voting machine. Poll workers say he started banging on the machines and broke two of them. Cleveland police say 61-year-old Marc Fenster walked in around 9:30 a.m. Tuesday. Witnesses say he said a few words and then started beating on the machines. Poll workers restrained the man until police arrived. The Board of Elections says the memory cards in the machines still have votes. And those votes will be counted after the polls close.

A nice summary of problems and snafu’s in the election–from machine problems to printer breakdowns–can be found in the San Jose Mercury News.

I received an interesting document recently, a document from California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson, titled “Uniform Vote Counting Standards” (dated March 23, 2006). The introduction summarizes the contents well:

Pursuant to Section 301 (a)(6) of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, the Secretary of State has developed these standards to define the circumstances under which “marking” of a ballot constitutes a vote and when a vote will or will not count for each category of voting system certified and in use in California.

A useful reference, for those interested in what the standards are in California for vote counting.

The Center for American Politics and Citizenship (CAPC) and the Human-Computer Interaction Lab (HCIL) is hosting a conference on the usability of electronic voting systems, at the University of Maryland on June 2, 2006.

The intended goal of the conference is to enrich the dialogue regarding voting issues facing the US, including accuracy, security, and verification’ and ‘will focus on the usability of different direct voting systems (including DREs and optical scans) and how they affect voter satisfaction, need for assistance, and voter accuracy. The workshop will present reflections from election officials and cutting edge research, and will work to answer questions about voter security and verification.’ Chairman Paul S. DeGregorio from the US Elections Assistance Commission will be the keynote speaker.

Michael Alvarez was invited to attend, but is unavailable on the scheduled date. We hope some of our colleagues will be able to attend!

One of the important things that we will be monitoring this year, especially in the upcoming June primaries in California, will be the widespread use of voter-verified paper audit trails. In many places, primary elections this year will be the first widespread use of these systems.

Orange County, California, has initiated a voter education campaign on the use of their voter-verified paper audit trail, and they recently have put up an interesting website dedicated to educating voters how to use their paper audit trail system (their vendor is Hart). The best link on the page is the live webcam from which viewers can watch installation of the paper audit trail mechanisms.

Another California county that uses the Hart voting device is San Mateo County, and here is their online information about the same voter-verification paper audit trail mechanism.

As we encounter additional examples (and I have no doubt I’ll get some email on this), I’ll post them.