The forthcoming Volume 18, Issue 2, of the Stanford Law & Policy Review contains a symposium on “Law of Democracy.” The table of contents for this issue is here. Of particular interest to Election Updates readers are a couple of papers in the issue:

• “How Hard Can It Be? Do Citizens Think It Is Difficult To Register To Vote?” R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Morgan Llewellyn.
• “The Analysis and Mitigation of Election Errors: Theory, Practice, Policy”, Edward B. Foley.
• “Partisan Law Enforcement”, Michael J. Pitts.

We’ll let readers know when this issue is published and available.

Ron Rivest, VTP colleague from MIT, recently sent me the following link to a paper that he recently wrote with Javed A. Aslam and Raluca A. Popa, “On Estimating the Size and Confidence of a Statistical Audit.” I’ve not read the entire paper yet, but did want to post the link for other readers.

Here’s what just went out:

Pew and JEHT Foundation Announce $2 Million in Grants Available to Study and Improve U.S. Elections

The Pew Center on the States (www.pewcenteronthestates.org), a division of The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the JEHT Foundation have announced $2 million in grants available to help diagnose how well U.S. elections are run and plan pilot projects to be conducted in 2007 and 2008.

The request for proposals (RFP) is part of a larger Pew initiative called Make Voting Work. Make Voting Work is focused on improving the accuracy, convenience, efficiency and security of U.S. elections. Proposals will be accepted through June 4, 2007.

The RFP targets election officials and academics studying elections issues, diverse academic disciplines (e.g., computer science, economics, engineering, human factors and design, operations and management, mathematics), private-sector companies with applicable expertise, non-profits and non-governmental organizations.

For more information please visit http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org to read the RFP or FAQ with details on how to apply and get connected with potential partners.

The Pew Center on the States point of contact is Scott Cody, Research Director (scody@pewcenteronthestates.org).

Today there are elections throughout our part of Los Angeles County, including some local city council races in Pasadena, school board runoffs in the greater Pasadena area, and a number of cities with local ballot measures. Melissa Slemin is working at a local polling place today, and soon we’ll hear about her experiences (as well as her earlier experiences with Delia Bailey working the previous local elections in the Pasadena area).

I headed over to our neighborhood polling place, and which is located in our local fire station ( here’s a picture of the entrance, with the fire truck parked outside). Turned out that they’ve started a massive road project on the street in front of the fire station, with traffic detoured and essentially all of the local street parking taken up by the construction project or vehicles. Here are a series of images so that you can see the problem:

• Photo 1, taken from across the street,
• Photo 2, taken from up the street showing the construction, the open trench in front of the sidewalk, and lack of parking down the street,,
• Photo 3, showing the polling place entrance, and the second drive where there were some parking places available in the lot of a local business,
• Photo 4, panning slightly to the right of Photo 3, showing the construction up the street,
• Photo 5, construction and vehicle across the street,
• Photo 6, shot from up the street showing the detour and the construction.

So all I had to do this morning to see a good example of potential poll site problems was around the corner. This is an example of scheduling snafus can make it hard for people to access a polling place. This is also an example of some of the potential denial of service problems that some of us have been writing about recently, including my “Precinct Voting Denial of Service” working paper.

The good news was that I voted by mail. But then as I was driving to my office I heard a story on National Public Radio about problems in Chicago — but also in many major cities — with mail delivery … We’re trying to find that USPS audit report mentioned in that study, and when we do, we’ll post it here!

Our Election Updates colleague, Paul Gronke, competed in today’s running of the Boston Marathon. According to the results on the Boston Athletic Association’s website, Paul completed the marathon in a time of 3:24:00, finishing 4113 overall, and 1230 in his division. If you want more details, follow this link, and just search by the last name “Gronke.”

There’s a long story behind this, but when Paul and I were both at Duke University (he on the faculty, and I a grad student), I introduced Paul to long-distance running … [an update, a mutual friend and colleague who knew Paul from graduate school told me that Paul ran cross-country before going to grad school, thus discounting whether I actually introduced Paul to long-distance running, or just re-introduced him; seems that we’ll have to hear Paul’s side of the story!].

The USEAC released a statement this morning an internal review of their procedures regarding research contracts:

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) directs the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource by, among other things, conducting studies with the goal of improving the administration of federal elections. To fulfill this mandate, the EAC has entered into contracts with a variety of persons and entities. Reports adopted by the EAC, a bipartisan federal entity, are likely to be cited as authoritative in public discourse. Prior to the EAC’s adopting a report submitted by a contractor, the EAC has the responsibility to ensure its accuracy and to verify that conclusions are supported by the underlying research.

The Commission takes input and constructive criticism from Congress and the public very seriously. We will take a hard look at the way we do business. Specifically, we will examine both the manner in which we have awarded contracts and our decision-making process regarding the release of research and reports. The EAC takes its mandates very seriously, and we will continue to move forward in a bipartisan way to improve the way America votes.

EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by HAVA. It is charged with administering payments to states and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, implementing election administration improvements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting equipment and serving as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election administration. The four EAC commissioners are Donetta Davidson, chair; Rosemary Rodriguez, Caroline Hunter and Gracia Hillman.

This comes on the heels of questions regarding how the EAC has released the results from two research studies, on election fraud and voter identification.

Here’s the link to the information on the RFP, for those interested … (Solicitation Number RFQ-1406-04-07-RQ-67699). Here’s the summary of the project:

3.0 Scope: Survey information is currently being collected; the deadline for states to submit survey information is March 7, 2007. The Contractor shall be responsible for the collection, coding, cleanup, tabulation, analysis of data collected through the 2006 Election Administration and Voting Survey, and for preparing three draft reports based on the survey data. The Contractor shall also be responsible for data entry for those states (approximately 20%) that chose not to submit their data via the EAC’s electronic submission utility.

The EAC anticipates that some of the data submitted by the states will be incomplete or have data quality issues, notwithstanding the preparatory steps the EAC has taken to minimize such issues. The Contractor shall be responsible for identifying and reporting problems with the quality of the data to the EAC and the states, and shall contact the states for clarification of the data provided. The Contractor shall be responsible for all data entry related to entering or verifying missing or incorrect data.

The Contractor shall develop and describe a methodology for analyzing and reporting the survey data. In developing this methodology the Contractor shall reference similar studies and analyses performed in the past. The Contractor shall produce three final draft reports: (1) The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, (2) Report on Absentee Ballots Transmitted to and Received from Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Voters 2006, and (3) Election Day Survey Report: November 2006. The Contractor shall also generate a master dataset for the survey and one for each state; and the Contractor shall develop a codebook to accompany the datasets. The EAC envisions that the datasets will complement the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) being developed for the EAC’s website, and will provide a resource for secondary analysis for researchers and users of the data.

The EAC shall be responsible for contacting states that have not submitted data by the due date. The EAC will also give the Contractor (1) administrative rights to its electronic submission utility, and (2) access to the GIS being developed for graphic representation of the survey data. The EAC shall provide the Contractor with the name and contact information for the individual responsible for responding to the survey for each state.

There is a very interesting, and provocative, article in the current issue of Wired Magazine, by Clive Thompson, “The See-Through CEO.” In the article, Thompson talks about a new trend of openness and transparency that is seeping into corporate governance, even in some large Fortune-500 companies. One trend that he writes about in particular involves how corporate executives in many large firms are using the Internet, for example blogs and YouTube, to disseminate information about their corporation quickly and effectively.

Here’s an excerpt:

Radical forms of transparency are now the norm at startups – and even some Fortune 500 companies. It is a strange and abrupt reversal of corporate values. Not long ago, the only public statements a company ever made were professionally written press releases and the rare, stage-managed speech by the CEO. Now firms spill information in torrents, posting internal memos and strategy goals, letting everyone from the top dog to shop-floor workers blog publicly about what their firm is doing right – and wrong. Jonathan Schwartz, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, dishes company dirt and apologizes to startups he’s accidentally screwed. Venture capitalists now demand that CEOs be fluent in blogspeak. In February, after JetBlue trapped passengers for hours in its storm-grounded planes and canceled 1,100 flights, CEO David Neeleman tried to deflect the blast of bad publicity by using YouTube to air his own blunt mea culpa. Microsoft, once a paragon of buttoned-down control, now posts uncensored internal videos – and encourages its engineers to blog freely about their projects (see page 140). The very process of developing ideas, products, and messages is changing – from musing about it in a room with your top people to throwing it out on the Web and asking the global smartmob for a little help.

We saw some hints of how openness and transparency might lead to the development of new research, and even possible collaborations between academia and industry, in our recent Voting Systems Vendor Workshop at Caltech. I hope that voting system vendors, and perhaps the election administration community more broadly, will read Thompson’s article (and some of the other similar articles in this issue of Wired about how corporations are using technology to improve transparency and their corporate bottom-lines). It would be a great step forward if we were to see corporate executives from voting system vendors develop blogs and use the Internet in innovative ways to improve transparency of their corporate operations. I’m not aware of any such practices yet in the voting system industry in the U.S., but will of course let readers know if I learn of any!

Just picked up this announcement from the EAC:

For Immediate Release
March 30, 2007

Contact:
Jeannie Layson
Bryan Whitener
(202) 566-3100

EAC to Launch Comprehensive Study of Voter ID Laws

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has voted unanimously to launch a comprehensive study focused on voter identification laws after concluding that initial research it received in a report, which focused on only one election cycle, was not sufficient to draw any conclusions. The Commission declined to adopt the report, but is releasing all of the data to the public.

The report and the research, conducted by Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, through its Eagleton Institute of Politics, are available at http://www.eac.gov . The Commission’s statement regarding its decision is attached.

“After careful consideration of the initial research, the Commission decided this important issue deserves a more in-depth research approach, and that it should be examined beyond only one election cycle,” said EAC Chair Donetta Davidson. “The Commission and our contractor agree that the research conducted for EAC raises more questions than provides answers.”

EAC’s strategy for moving forward is based upon an examination of the initial research and the testimony and discussion about this research project at the Commission’s February 8, 2007 public meeting. For more information about the public meeting, including the agenda, transcript, and testimony go to http://www.eac.gov/Public_Meeting_020807.asp .

EAC’s future research on this topic will be expanded to include more than one federal election, environmental and political factors, and the numerous changes in state laws and regulations related to voter identification requirements that have occurred since 2004. EAC’s comprehensive research approach will undertake the following activities:

* Conduct an ongoing state-by-state review, reporting and tracking of voter identification requirements.

* Establish a baseline of information that will include factors that may affect or influence Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) voter participation. EAC will use some of the information collected by the contractor as well as additional data from the states to develop this baseline.

* In 2007, convene a working group of advocates, academics, research methodologists and election officials to discuss EAC’s next study of voter identification.

* Study how voter identification provisions that have been in place for two or more federal elections have impacted voter turnout, voter registration figures, and fraud.

* Publish a series of best practice case studies which detail a particular state’s or jurisdiction’s experiences with educating poll workers and voters about various voter identification requirements.

EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). It is charged with administering payments to states and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, implementing election administration improvements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting equipment and serving as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election administration. The four EAC commissioners are Donetta Davidson, chair; Rosemary Rodriguez, Caroline Hunter and Gracia Hillman.

# # #

EAC Statement on Study of Voter Identification Requirements

Background

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) authorizes the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to conduct periodic studies of election administration issues. In May 2005, EAC contracted with Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey through its Eagleton Institute of Politics (“Contractor”) to perform a review and legal analysis of state legislation, administrative procedures and court cases, and to perform a literature review on other research and data available on the topic of voter identification requirements. Further, the Contractor was asked to analyze the problems and challenges of voter identification, to hypothesize alternative approaches and to recommend various policies that could be applied to these approaches.

The Contractor performed a statistical analysis of the relationship of various requirements for voter identification to voter turnout in the 2004 election. Drawing on its nationwide review and legal analysis of state statutes and regulations for voter identification, the contractor compared states with similar voter identification requirements and drew conclusions based on comparing turnout rates among states for one election – November 2004. For example, the turnout rate in 2004 in states that required the voter to provide a photo identification document* was compared to the turnout rate in 2004 in states with a requirement that voters give his or her name in order to receive a ballot. Contractor used two sets of data to estimate turnout rates: 1) voting age population estimates* and 2) individual-level survey data from the November 2004 Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.*

The Contractor presented testimony summarizing its findings from this statistical and data analysis at the February 8, 2007 public meeting of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. The Contractor’s testimony, its summary of voter identification requirements by State, its summary of court decisions and literature on voter identification and related issues, an annotated bibliography on voter identification issues and its summary of state statutes and regulations affecting voter identification are attached to this report and can also be found on EAC’s website, http://www.eac.gov.

EAC Declines to Adopt Draft Report

EAC finds the Contractor’s summary of States’ voter identification requirements and its summary of state laws, statutes, regulations and litigation surrounding the implementation of voter identification requirements, to be a first step in the Commission’s efforts to study the possible impact of voter identification requirements.

However, EAC has concerns regarding the data, analysis, and statistical methodology the Contractor used to analyze voter identification requirements to determine if these laws have an impact on turnout rates. The study only focused on one federal election. An analysis using averaged county-level turnout data from the U.S. Census showed no statistically significant correlations. A second analysis using a data set based upon the Current Population Survey (which was self-reported and showed a significantly higher turnout rate than other conventional data) was conducted that produced some evidence of correlation between voter identification requirements and turnout. The initial categorization of voter identification requirements included classifications that, actually, require no identification documentation, such as “state your name.” The research methodology and the statistical analysis used by the Contractor were questioned by an EAC review group comprised of social scientists and statisticians. The Contractor and the EAC agree that the report raises more questions than provides answers and both agree the study should have covered more than one federal election.* Thus, EAC will not adopt the Contractor’s study and will not issue an EAC report based upon this study. All of the material provided by the Contractor is attached.

*1 In 2004, three of the states that authorized election officials to request photo identification allowed voters to provide a non-photo ID and still vote a regular ballot and two others permitted voters who lacked photo ID to vote a regular ballot by swearing and affidavit.
*2 The July 2004 estimates
for voting age population were provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. These data did not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens; because these numbers include non-citizens, the Contractor applied the percentage of citizens included in voting age population statistics in 2000 to the U.S. Census Bureau estimated voting age population in 2004. Thus, 2004 estimates of voting age population include persons who are not registered to vote.
*3 The Current Population Survey is based on reports from self-described registered voters who also describe themselves as U.S. citizens.
*4 See Transcript of EAC Public Meeting, February 8, 2007, page 109.

Further EAC Study on Voter Identification Requirements

EAC will engage in a longer-term, more systematic review of voter identification requirements. Additional study on the topic will include more than one Federal election cycle, additional environmental and political factors that effect voter participation and the numerous changes in state laws and regulations related to voter identification requirements that have occurred since 2004.

EAC will undertake the following activities:

* Conduct an ongoing state-by-state review, reporting and tracking of voter identification requirements. This will include tracking states’ requirements which require a voter to state his or her name, to sign his or her name, to match his or her signature to a signature on file, to provide photo or non-photo identification or to swear an affidavit affirming his or her identify.

* Establish a baseline of information that will include factors that may affect or influence Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) voter participation, including various voter identification requirements, the competitiveness of a race and certain environmental or political factors. EAC will use some of the information collected by Eagleton as well as additional data from the states to develop this baseline.

* In 2007, convene a working group of advocates, academics, research methodologists and election officials to discuss EAC’s next study of voter identification. Topics to be discussed include methodology, specific issues to be covered in the study and timelines for completing an EAC study on voter identification.

* Study how voter identification provisions that have been in place for two or more Federal elections have impacted voter turnout, voter registration figures, and fraud. Included in this study will be an examination of the relationship between voter turnout and other factors such as race and gender. Study the effects of voter identification provisions, or the lack thereof, on early, absentee and vote-by-mail voting.

* Publish a series of best practice case studies which detail a particular state’s or jurisdiction’s experiences with educating poll workers and voters about various voter identification requirements. Included in the case studies will be detail on the policies and practices used to educate and inform poll workers and voters.

###

A story has been circulating in the media today, by Ian Hoffman, regarding new standards that California’s new Secretary of State is proposing for voting systems. I’ve received a copy of the proposed draft standards, and here they are:

TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS
The Secretary of State intends within the next several weeks to begin a top-to-bottom review of voting systems currently certified for use in California elections. The goal of the review is to determine whether currently certified voting systems provide acceptable levels of security, accessibility, ballot secrecy, accuracy and usability under federal and state standards. For those that do not meet acceptable levels, the review will help determine whether certification should be withdrawn unconditionally, or withdrawn subject to re-certification with additional conditions on use for elections in 2007 and 2008.
Pursuant to Elections Code Section 19222, any decertification decision would only be effective for elections held more than six months later. Accordingly, a decertification decision made on or before August 3, 2007, would be effective for the February 5, 2008, presidential primary election. Every effort will be made to complete the top-to-bottom review of all voting systems before August. This will ensure that no voting system known to fall short of California’s high standards will be used in any of the three major statewide elections scheduled for 2008. It will also assure local elections officials, poll workers and voters that they will not be required to change voting systems during the short intervals between the February and June 2008 elections and between the June and November 2008 elections, unless a serious new flaw is discovered that makes a later decertification unavoidable.
What follows is a set of draft criteria to guide the review of currently certified voting systems. The Secretary of State welcomes questions, comments and recommendations for changes from local elections officials, voting system vendors and any member of the public. This is only a draft; the final criteria may reflect substantial revisions based on the responses received and/or further review.
Please submit your questions, comments and recommendations regarding the draft criteria in writing no later than March 30, 2007 to:
By mail:
Secretary Debra Bowen
1500 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
ATTN: Voting Systems Review, 6th Floor
By e-mail:
votingsystems@sos.ca.gov
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
3/22/2007

After considering all questions, comments and recommendations submitted in response to the draft criteria, the Secretary of State will adopt final criteria no later than April 6, 2007.
DRAFT CRITERIA
Section 19205 of the Elections Code authorizes the Secretary of State to establish specifications for voting machines, voting devices, vote tabulating devices, and any software used for each, including the programs and procedures for vote tabulating and testing. These criteria must include suitability for the purpose for which a machine or device is intended, preservation of the secrecy of the ballot and safety of the voting system from fraud or manipulation. Pursuant to the authority established in Elections Code Section 19205, as well as the authority established by Section 12172.5 of the Government Code and Sections 10, 19222, 19227 and 19250 of the Elections Code, the Secretary of State hereby establishes criteria for the review of all voting systems currently certified for use in the State of California.
In each of the examination and testing processes set forth below, qualified reviewers selected by the Secretary will evaluate compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Elections Code, voluntary federal voting system standards as incorporated into California law by the Elections Code, and other applicable requirements imposed by state and federal law, including, but not limited to, Article II, Sections 2.5 and 7 of the California Constitution.
I. SECURITY.
1. Security Standards.
For purposes of these standards, “untraceable vote tampering” means preventing the accurate electronic recording of votes, or altering the record of votes, to change the result of an election in a manner that leaves no electronic record of tampering. “Denial of service attack” means disabling a voting system other than through sheer physical destruction in a manner that renders the voting system inoperable for voting.
a. DREs. Each direct recording electronic voting system (“DRE”), as defined in Elections Code Section 19251(b), must incorporate, as part of its design, hardware, firmware and/or software program features that effectively secure the DRE and all electronic media used with the DRE against untraceable vote tampering or denial of service attacks by any person with access to the DRE, its firmware, software and/or electronic media during their manufacture, transport, storage, temporary storage, programming, testing and use, including the electronic ballot definition or layout process.
b. Vote Tabulating Devices. Each “vote tabulating device,” as that term is defined in Elections Code Section 358, must incorporate, as part of its design, hardware, firmware and/or software program features that effectively secure the vote tabulating
DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
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2

device and all electronic media used with the vote tabulating device against untraceable vote tampering or “denial of service” attacks by any person with access to the vote tabulating device, its firmware, software and/or electronic media during their manufacture, transport, storage, temporary storage, programming, testing and use.
c. Ballot Tally Computers and Ballot Tally Software. Each computer used to tally ballots and each “ballot tally software program,” as that term is used in Elections Code Section 19103, must incorporate, as part of its design, hardware, firmware and/or software program features that effectively secure the computer, the ballot tally software program and all electronic media used with the computer and program against untraceable vote tampering or “denial of service” attacks by any person with access to ballot tally software program, the ballot tally computer, its firmware, software and/or electronic media during their manufacture, transport, storage, temporary storage, programming, testing and use.
2. Security Testing.
The security of each DRE, vote tabulating device and ballot tally computer will be tested using two complementary methods, “red teaming” and source code review. The Secretary will select qualified industry and academic experts in computer and software security, including experts in electronic voting systems, to perform both types of tests.
a. Red Teaming. The “red teaming” process is analogous to military training exercises in which the members of the “red team” are adversaries trying to defeat friendly, “blue team” forces. The red team exercise will be designed to simulate conditions in which a voting system might be vulnerable to attack in the actual cycle of manufacturing, programming, delivery, testing, storage, temporary storage and use in California elections. Initially, the team will approach the system knowing nothing of its source code. Knowledge of source code may be used in subsequent attack attempts. The objective will be to determine whether and to what degree it is possible to compromise the security of the voting system to interfere with the accurate recording of votes or alter the record of votes to change the result of an election.
b. Source Code Review. The second component of security testing will be source code review. The objective of the source code review will be to identify anything in the code that could be used maliciously to interfere with the accurate recording of votes or alter the recor
d of votes to change the result of an election. The source code review may be performed prior to, during or after completion of the risk assessment.
3. Security Findings.
Upon completion of either component of the security testing, the Secretary of State may make written findings that a DRE, vote tabulation device or ballot tally computer is not reasonably secured against untraceable vote tampering and “denial of service” attacks by features included in the design of its hardware, firmware and/or
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software. On the basis of such written findings, the Secretary may immediately initiate the process to withdraw certification.
II. ACCESS FOR VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES.
1. Disability Access Standards.
The federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that all polling places in elections for federal office have at least one voting system that is “accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters.”
Under Elections Code Section 19250(a), the Secretary of State may not certify a DRE unless the system “includes an accessible voter verified paper audit trail.” Elections Code Section 19250(d) requires that all DRE voting systems “shall include a method by which a voter may electronically verify, through a nonvisual method, the information that is contained on the paper record copy of that voter’s ballot.” Under Elections Code Section 19251(a), “’[a]ccessible’ means that the information provided on the paper record copy from the voter verified paper audit trail mechanism is provided or conveyed to voters via both a visual and a nonvisual method, such as through an audio component.”
2. Disability Access Testing.
Each voting system will be examined to determine whether it complies with the accessibility requirements of HAVA and the Elections Code. The examination will be conducted with the assistance of persons from the disabled community. For purposes of this review, a voting system complies only if it provides all of the following features and capabilities in at least one voting system available for use in every polling place:
(a) A dual-switch input control interface that permits use of “sip and puff” or other adaptive devices by voters with paralysis or severe manual dexterity disabilities who are unable to use touch screens or tactile key inputs.
(b) The capability for the voter to select simultaneous and synchronized audio and visual outputs, audio outputs only or visual outputs only.
(c) Voter-adjustable magnification, contrast and display color settings to improve the readability of text on the video displays.
(d) Variable audio output levels and playback speed for voters with hearing impairments.
(e) Privacy curtains or shields that effectively prevent others from observing or hearing the selections of a voter using such features as audio output, simultaneous,
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synchronized audio and visual output, display magnification or modified display font, contrast or color settings.
(f) In the case of a DRE, the capability to permit a voter to verify electronically, through a nonvisual method, the information that is contained on the voter verifiable paper record copy of that voter’s ballot. This requirement is satisfied by a method of nonvisual confirmation that draws the information provided to the voter from either (1) the paper record copy itself or (2) the same electronic data stream used to print the voter verifiable paper record copy.
3. Disability Access Findings.
The Secretary of State may make written findings, based on the results of the disability access testing described above, that a voting system fails to include any of the foregoing disability access features and capabilities, in which case the Secretary of State may immediately initiate the process to withdraw certification from the voting system for disability access use.
III. ACCESS FOR MINORITY LANGUAGE VOTERS.
HAVA requires that every voting system used in an election for federal office “shall provide alternative language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a).” Every certified voting system will be tested to determine whether it provides alternative language accessibility in the federally mandated language or languages for each county that uses or intends to use the system. If the Secretary of State makes written findings, based on the results of the minority language access testing, that a voting system does not provide alternative language access as required by federal law, the Secretary of State may immediately initiate the process to withdraw certification from the voting system with respect to the affected county or counties.
IV. USABILITY FOR ELECTIONS OFFICIALS AND POLL WORKERS.
Each certified voting system must be designed, configured and accompanied by sufficient documentation and training materials so that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, elections officials and poll workers can independently and without assistance or intervention by employees or contractors of an election system vendor, carry out all operations necessary to open the polls, set up and calibrate voting system equipment, instruct and assist voters in registering votes and casting ballots, respond to voting system error messages or temporary power failures, close the polls, print end-of-day vote totals, take down voting system equipment, transfer polling place results to central tally computers and tally final results.
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The Secretary of State will conduct a review of each voting system’s documentation and records regarding the use of the voting system by elections officials and poll workers in California elections. The Secretary of State may make written findings, based on the results of the review, that a voting system does not reasonably permit such independent operation. Based on such findings, the Secretary of State may immediately initiate the process to withdraw certification from the voting system.
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More comment later on these proposed testing standards, and hopefully I’ll also have a chance to edit this html to make it a bit easier to read …