It is surprisingly difficult to predict the percentage of ballots that will come in early, via in-person voting or no-excuse absentee ballots, in the upcoming primaries.  Many states have only recently begun to report individual voting histories that include the mode of ballot return, and even if they do have that information, even fewer provide the date.

At least one well-known data aggregator–Catalist--doesn’t capture the date of the ballot return on its permanent database, although that information is collected in real-time during election season.

Florida is a nice example: it does a wonderful job reporting early voting data, including the exact date that the ballot was cast.  Individual no-excusse absentee records, however, are only available to registered party committees and candidate organizations.

To make things even more complicated, we know that Republican voters have historically tended to use no-excuse absentee ballots at a much higher rate than Democratic voters.

With all these caveats, the table reports the percentage of ballots that were cast prior to election day in the 2008 general election for selected upcoming states. Any state reporting less than 20% advance voting has been excluded.  If you are trying to project backwards, most states now mail their domestic no-excuse ballots 45 days before the date of the election, the same time they are required to mail UOCAVA ballots/

Rick Perry robocalls targeted at absentee balloters: http://bit.ly/AfHP9G

The total number of absentee ballots in Florida exceeds the number of votes cast in NH and caucus goers in IA, and are double 2008 levels.  Thus far, 46,000 ballots have been returned: http://thesent.nl/yKaAEn

The time and place of Florida early in person voting: http://election.dos.state.fl.us/pdf/Early_Voting_Sites_PPP_2012.pdf

Page at the FL SoS office explaining the odd legal situation whereby you can obtain early voting reports but not no-excuse absentee reports: https://doe.dos.state.fl.us/fvrscountyballotreports/fvrsefilings.aspx

Yesterday’s posting has generated a lot of email traffic.  My personal interest in the study was the finding that online, email, or web-based contact and mobilization methods may not always be more efficient for the voter, or result in higher turnout or vote share.

It’s important to clarify, however, that the “online” voter registration materials being tested were a “print and mail” PDF form created by Rock the Vote, not the same thing as the fully online system being implemented by some states.

As far as I can tell, there is no study to date comparing the take up rate of fully online systems vs. paper systems vs. some hybrid, nor how different contact methods may improve take up of each system.

A new study published in the Political Research Quarterly (may be gated for some readers) by Elizabeth Bennion and David Nickerson is one of many recent articles that suggest that moving some part of voter mobilization activities online may actually reduce participation by raising transactional cost for some citizens. Completing some forms online, it turns out, it not actually easier for many segments of the population and for some activities.  As the authors note:

Unfortunately, the savings in communication introduced by Web sites and e-mail do not necessarily make such technologies effective campaign tools. Powerful anecdotal evidence suggests that e-mail can be an effective tool for activities that involve coordinating activists, such as campaign donations or rally attendance, but online communication tools exhibit two chief drawbacks for mass mobilization. First, social norms against sending unsolicited e-mail and the passive nature of Web sites (i.e., viewers need to seek out the Web site) limit the online campaign exposure to politically interested persons and supporters. While a campaign can engage and organize supporters very efficiently online, the vast majority of people casting a ballot will have no exposure to the online arm of a candidate’s campaign. The second drawback is that e-mail outreach is easy to ignore and has not been effective at increasing voter turnout.

The article in question draws on a large experimental study of registration activities on 26 college campuses, conducted in a partnership with Rock the Vote. The authors show that, while an email encouraging a citizen by itself may have no effect (or possibly a negative effect) on the likelihood of registration, a simple followup email that reminds the recipient to turn in the online form can offset much of the negative impact. In short, the authors write:

Rather than a nice bell or whistle if budget permits, follow-up is required to make online mobilization techniques effective. To the extent that organizations can mimic the hand-holding that occurs in government assistance offices and from volunteers in registration drives, the more effective such tactics will be.

Citizens who have registered to vote absentee can start to vote “in person” absentee in Missouri.

There aren’t a lot of Missouri absentee ballots cast–they are an “excuse required” state according to NCSL and according to our figures, 6.2% voted absentee in 2010 and 11% voted absentee in 2008.  We have not collected data on absentee voting in the primary (and can’t find it on Missouri’s website).

Whatever happens in the next few weeks, 630,000 absentee ballots are already in the mail. Rick Perry and Michelle Bachmann are on these ballots.

Orlando Sentinel story: http://bit.ly/sNi2xW

The 2010 Report and datasets have been released by the EAC.

Regardless of what happens to the Election Assistance Commission, I hope Congress continues to require and fund the Election Administration and Voting Survey (as well as the NVRA and UOCAVA surveys.

All three provide invaluable insights into the conduct of American elections voting, the most fundamental act of democracy and citizenship. Without the national perspective provided by these three data reporting instruments, it becomes much more difficult to impossible to monitor, evaluate, and improve the democratic process, whether it be making sure everyone who is eligible has a chance to register; that uniformed personnel and overseas citizens have sufficient time to vote; or that each American citizen, regardless of state, county, or township, has a full and equal right to vote.

The domestic absentee mailing deadline–for many states, not tied to the 45 day window mandated by the MOVE Act for UOCAVA ballots–is starting to impact the presidential race. I’ve argued in the past that states have probably made this change to save money and ease administration, but the domestic absentee ballots could be mailed much closer to the date of the election.

Today’s Richmond Times Dispatch story reports that the deadline for Gingrich to get on the VA ballot is January 21, so that the absentee and the precinct place ballots are identical.  

A recent paper by Marc Meredity and Neil Maholtra in the Election Law Journal (this article has been designated as free content) showed how changes in the list of candidates–mainly candidates who withdraw after absentee ballots are printed and early votes are cast–can substantially alter voter decision making.  I don’t think the authors have thought about the reverse, candidates who may not be on an absentee ballot but do make it onto the polling place ballot!

Here is a link to the EAC report: http://www.eac.gov/blogs/eac_issues_formal_investigation_report_on_ds200_precinct_count_optical_scanner/

I’m sure that Charles, Paul and Thad may have thoughts about this report and it’s implications soon.

Today, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to observe the Russian Federation Duma Elections presented its preliminary findings in a press conference in Moscow.

In its overall conclusions the mission found, that

Despite the lack of a level playing field during the Russian State Duma elections, voters took advantage of their right to express their choice, the international observers concluded in a statement issued today.The observers noted that the preparations for the elections were technically well-administered across a vast territory, but were marked by a convergence of the state and the governing party, limited political competition and a lack of fairness.

Although seven political parties ran, the prior denial of registration to certain parties had narrowed political competition. The contest was also slanted in favour of the ruling party: the election administration lacked independence, most media were partial and state authorities interfered unduly at different levels. The observers also noted that the legal framework had been improved in some respects and televised debates for all parties provided one level platform for contestants.

On election day, voting was well organized overall, but the quality of the process deteriorated considerably during the count, which was characterized by frequent procedural violations and instances of apparent manipulations, including serious indications of ballot box stuffing.

In this election the mission also for the first time observed the use of new voting technologies in the Russian Federation, as across the country, ballot scanners were used in 4,800 polling stations and 326 polling stations were equipped with touch screen electronic voting systems.

Voting using electronic touch screen machines was well organized overall and was carried out without technical problems. It was, however, observed that most voters needed help when casting their votes. A number of observer teams reported problems with the secrecy of the vote related to the use of ballot scanning machines.

Touch screen voting machines were equipped with an embedded printer giving voters the possibility to verify their vote whilst voting. Although this enhanced the verifiability of the process, the fact that votes were printed consecutively on one strip of paper created the potential for the violation of the secrecy of the vote.

PEC members in most of the regions observed received training on the use of new voting technologies. The practice of publicly testing both systems on or immediately prior to election day can potentially help build trust in e-enabled voting. However, the absence of provisions for random mandatory manual recounts of the processed ballots is of concern.

In addition, transparency in the design and functioning of both systems is insufficient as both types of technologies are based on proprietary software not open to public scrutiny.

Find the full statement here. A full report is to be expected in two months time after the end of electoral cycle.